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Abstract
This paper presents an investigation on the structure of conditional events and
on the probability measures which arise naturally in this context. In particular we
introduce a construction which defines a (finite) Boolean algebra of conditionals from
any (finite) Boolean algebra of events. By doing so we distinguish the properties
of conditional events which depend on probability and those which are intrinsic to
the logico-algebraic structure of conditionals. Our main result provides a way to re-
gard standard two-place conditional probabilities as one-place probability functions
on conditional events. We also consider a logical counterpart of our Boolean algebras
of conditionals with links to preferential consequence relations for non-monotonic rea-
soning. The overall framework of this paper provides a novel perspective on the rich
interplay between logic and probability in the representation of conditional knowledge.
KEYWORDS Conditional probability; conditional events; Boolean algebras; prefer-
ential consequence relations
1 Introduction and motivation
Conditional expressions are pivotal in representing knowledge and reasoning abilities of
intelligent agents. Conditional reasoning features in a wide range of areas spanning non-
monotonic reasoning, causal inference, learning, and more generally reasoning under un-
certainty.
This paper proposes an algebraic structure for conditional events which serves as a
logical basis to analyse the concept of conditional probability – a fundamental tool in
Artificial Intelligence.
At least since the seminal work of Gaifman [22], who in turn develops the initial ideas
of his supervisor Alfred Tarski [31], it has been considered natural to investigate the
conditions under which Boolean algebras – i.e. classical logic – played the role of the logic
of events for probability. The point is clearly made in [23]:
Since events are always described in some language they can be identified with
the sentences that describe them and the probability function can be regarded
as an assignment of values to sentences. The extensive accumulated knowledge
concerning formal languages makes such a project feasible.
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We are interested in pursuing the same idea, but taking conditional probability as a
primitive notion and obtain unconditional probability by specialisation. Taking condi-
tional probability as primitive has a long tradition which dates back at least to [12] and
includes [32, 44, 45, 51]. The key justification for doing this lies in the methodological
view that no assessment of probability takes place in a vacuum. On the contrary, each
probabilistic evaluation must be done in the light of all and only the available evidence.
In this sense, any probabilistic assessment of uncertainty is always conditional.
The first step in achieving our goal is to clarify how conditional knowledge and in-
formation should be represented. To do this we put forward a structure for representing
conditional events, taken as the primitive objects of uncertainty quantification. In other
words we aim to capture the logic/algebra which plays the role of classical logic when
the focus of probability theory is shifted on conditional probability. In our preliminary
investigations [20, 21] on the subject we suggested taking the methodological approach of
asking the following questions:
(i) which properties of conditional probabilities depend on properties of the measure
and do not depend on the logical properties of conditional events?
(ii) which properties do instead depend on the logic – whatever it is – of conditional
events?
Bruno de Finetti was the first not to take the notion of conditional events for granted
and argued that they cannot be described by truth-functional classical logic. He expressed
this by referring to conditional events as trievents [12, 14], with the following motivation.
Since, intuitively, conditional events of the form “a given b” express some form of hypo-
thetical assertion – the assertion of the consequent a based on the supposition that the
antecedent b is satisfied – the logical evaluation of a conditional amounts to a two-step
procedure. We first check the antecedent. If this is not satisfied, the conditional ceases
to mean anything at all. Otherwise we move on to evaluating the consequent and the
conditional event takes the same value as the consequent.
This interpretation allowed de Finetti to use the classical notion of uncertainty res-
olution for conditional events implicitly assumed by Hausdorff and Kolmogorov, except
for the fact that de Finetti allowed the evaluation of conditional events to be a partial
function. This is illustrated clearly by referring to the betting interpretation of subjective
probability, which indeed can be extended to a number of coherence-based measures of
uncertainty [18, 19]. To illustrate this, fix an uncertainty resolving valuation v, or in other
words a two-valued classical logic valuation. Then de Finetti interprets conditional events
“θ given φ” as follows:
a bet on “θ given φ” is


won if v(φ) = v(θ) = 1;
lost if v(φ) = 1 and v(θ) = 0;
called-off if v(φ) = 0.
This idea has been developed in uncertain reasoning, with links with non monotonic
reasoning, in [17, 36, 35, 34]. In the context of probability logic, this approach has been
pursued in detail in [9]. Note that this latter approach is measure-theoretically oriented,
and yet the semantics of conditional events is three-valued. The algebra of conditional
events developed in the present paper, on the contrary, will be a Boolean algebra. Hence,
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as we will point out in due time, the three-valued semantics of conditional events is not
incompatible with requiring that conditional events form a Boolean algebra. What makes
this possible is that uncertainty-resolving valuations no longer correspond to classical logic
valuations, as in de Finetti’s work. Rather, as it will be clear from our algebraic analysis,
they will correspond to finite total orders of valuations of classical logics. This crucially
allows for the formal representation of the “gaps” in uncertainty resolution which arise
when the antecedent of a conditional is evaluated to 0, forcing the bet to be called off.
Some readers may be familiar with the copious and multifarious literature spanning
philosophical logic, linguistics and psychology which seeks to identify, sometimes proba-
bilistically, how “conditionals” depart from Boolean (aka material) implication. Within
this literature emerged a view according to which conditional probability can be viewed as
the probability of a suitably defined conditional. A detailed comparison with a proposal,
due to Van Fraassen, in this spirit will be done in Subsection 8.2. However it may be
pointed out immediately that a key contribution of this literature has been the very useful
argument, due to David Lewis [39], according to which the conditioning operator “|” can-
not be taken, on pain of trivialising probability functions, to be a Boolean connective, and
in particular material implication. This clearly reinforces the view, held since de Finetti’s
early contributions, that conditional events have their own algebra and logic. A key con-
tribution of this paper is to argue that this role can be played by what we term Boolean
Algebras of Conditionals (BAC). Armed with these algebraic structures, we can proceed to
investigate the relation between conditional probabilities and (plain) probability measures
on Boolean Algebras of Conditionals. In particular we construct, for each positive prob-
ability measure on a finite Boolean algebra, its canonical extension to a Boolean Algebra
of Conditionals which coincides with the conditional probability on the starting algebra.
Hence we provide a formal setting in which the probability of conditional events can be re-
garded as conditional probability. This contributes to a long-standing question which has
been put forward, re-elaborated and discussed by many authors along the years, and whose
general form can be roughly stated as follows: conditional probability is the probability of
conditionals [1, 39, 49, 51, 26, 33].1
In the late 1960 logic-based Artificial Intelligence started to encompass qualitative
uncertainty. First through the notion of negation-as-failure in logic programming, then
with the rise of non-monotonic logics, a field which owes substantially to the 1980 double
special issue of Artificial Intelligence edited by D.G. Bobrow. Much of the following decade
was devoted to identifying general patterns in non monotonic reasoning, in the felicitous
turn of phrase due to David Makinson [41]. One prominent such pattern emerged from
the semantical approach put forward by Shoham [48]. According to it, a sentence θ is a
non-monotonic consequence of a sentence φ if θ is (classically) satisfied by all preferred or
most normal models of φ. This equipped the syntactic notion of defaults – i.e. conditionals
which are taken to be defeasibly true – with a natural semantics: defaults are conditionals
which are “normally” true, where normality is captured by suitably ordering classical
models. Ordered models have then been the key to providing remarkable unity [38] to
non-monotonic reasoning, which by the early 2000s encompassed not only a variety of
1 To some extent it can be regarded as a simplified version of Adams’s thesis [1, 2], claiming that the
assertibility of a conditional a⇒ b correlates with the conditional probability P (b | a) of the consequent b
given the antecedent a. A more concrete statement of this thesis was put forward by Stalnaker by equating
Adam’s notion of assertability with that of probability: P (a ⇒ b) = P (a ∧ b)/P (a), whenever P (a) > 0,
known in the literature as Stalnaker’s thesis [49].
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default logics [42], but also AGM-style theory revision [40] and social choice theory [46].
In light of all this, it is noteworthy that the Boolean Algebras of Conditionals lend
themselves to an axiomatisation which turns out to be sound and complete with respect to
a class of preferential structures. The details are deferred to Section 7, where in addition
we show that the logic of boolean conditionals therein defined satisfies the properties of
preferential non-monotonic consequence relations, in the sense pioneered by the seminal
paper [37] and refined by [38]. In spite of its technical simplicity, we think this result
is methodologically very significant for it provides strong reasons in support of the very
definition of the Boolean Algebra of Conditionals. In other words, the fact that its logical
counterpart leads to the most widely investigated framework for nonmonotonic reason-
ing, justifies our interpretation of the algebra investigated in Section 3 as the algebra of
conditionals.
Structure and summary of contributions of the paper
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction and recalling some basic facts
about Boolean algebras in Section 2, we present in Section 3 the main construction which
allows us to define, starting from any Boolean algebraA of events, a corresponding Boolean
algebra of conditional events C(A). These algebras C(A), whose elements are objects of
the form (a | b) for a, b ∈ A and their boolean combinations, are finite if the original
algebras A are so.
Section 4 is dedicated to the atomic structure of Boolean algebras of conditionals. The
main result is a full characterization of the atoms of each finite C(A) in terms of the
atoms of A. This characterization is a fundamental step for the rest of the paper. Further
elaborating on the atomic structure, Section 5 presents two tree-like representations for
the set of atoms of an algebra of conditionals which will be decisive in establishing the
main result of the paper in Section 6.
In fact, Section 6 introduces probability measures on Boolean algebras of conditionals
and presents our main result to the effect that every positive probability P on a finite
Boolean algebra A can be canonically extended to a positive probability µP on C(A)
which agrees with the “conditionalised” version of the former. That is, we prove that, for
every a, b ∈ A with b 6= ⊥,
µP (‘(a | b)’) = P (a ∧ b)/P (b).
As a welcome consequence of our investigation we provide an alternative, finitary,
solution to the problem known in the literature as the strong conditional event problem,
introduced and solved in the infinite setting of the Goodman and Nguyen’s Conditional
Event Algebras of [26].
Although our Boolean algebras of conditionals do not allow for an equational descrip-
tion, the characterizing properties of these algebras are expressible in an expansion of the
language of classical propositional logic and hence they give rise naturally to a simple logic
of (non-nested) conditionals, that we name LBC (for Logic of Boolean Conditionals). This
is investigated in Section 7, where we axiomatize the logic and prove soundness and com-
pleteness with respect to a class of preferential structures. Moreover, we show that LBC
satisfies the properties of preferential non-monotonic consequence relations, in the sense
pioneered by the seminal paper [37] and refined by [38]. Finally, Section 8 draws some
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detailed comparisons between our contributions and the research on Measure-free condi-
tionals (Subsection 8.1) and with Conditional Event Algebras (Subsection 8.2). Section 9
outlines a set of key issues for future work.
To facilitate the reading of the paper, most proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Preliminaries: Boolean algebras in a nutshell
The algebraic framework of this paper is that of Boolean algebras and hence its logical
setting is that of classical propositional logic (CPL). Here, we will briefly recap on some
needed notions and basic results about Boolean algebras and CPL, for a more exhaustive
introduction about this subject we invite the reader to consult [7, §IV], and [10, 25, 29].
Given a countable (finite or infinite) set V of propositional variables, the CPL language
L(V ) (or simply L when V will be clear by the context) is the smallest set containing V
and closed under the usual connectives ∧,∨,¬,⊥, and ⊤ of type (2, 2, 1, 0, 0). Along this
paper we will use the notation ϕ,ψ, etc (with possible subscript) for formulas. Further,
we shall adopt the following abbreviations:
ϕ→ ψ = ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ↔ ψ = (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
We shall denote by ⊢CPL the provability relation of CPL, in particular we will write
⊢CPL ϕ to denote that ϕ is a theorem.
A logical valuation (or simply a valuation) of L is a map from v : V → {0, 1}, which
uniquely extends to a function, that we denote by the same symbol v, from L to {0, 1}
in accordance with the usual Boolean truth functions, i.e. v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = min{v(ϕ), v(ψ)},
v(⊥) = 0, v(¬ϕ) = 1− v(ϕ), etc. We shall denote by Ω the set of all valuations of L. For
a given formula ϕ and a given valuation v ∈ Ω, we will write v |= ϕ whenever v(ϕ) = 1.
We will broadly adopt, analogously to the above recalled logical frame, the signature
(∧,∨,¬,⊥,⊤) of type (2, 2, 1, 0, 0) for the algebraic language upon which Boolean algebras
are defined. Thus, the same conventions and abbreviations of L can be adopted also in
the algebraic setting. Further, in every Boolean algebra A = (A,∧,∨,¬,⊥,⊤) we shall
write a ≤ b, whenever a→ b = ⊤. The relation ≤ is indeed the lattice-order in A. Thus,
a ≤ b iff a ∧ b = a iff a ∨ b = b.
Along this paper, in order to distinguish an algebra from its universe, we will denote
the former by A, B etc, and the latter by A, B etc, respectively.
Recall that a map h : A → B between Boolean algebras is a homomorphism if h
commutes with the operations of their language, that is, h(⊤A) = ⊤B, h(¬Aa) = ¬Bh(a),
h(a∧A b) = h(a)∧Bh(b) etc, (notice that we adopt subscripts to distinguish the operations
of A from those of B). Bijective (or 1-1) homomorphisms are called isomorphisms and if
there is a isomorphism between A and B, they are said to be isomorphic (and we write
A ∼= B).
A congruence of a Boolean algebra A is an equivalence relation ≡ on A which is
compatible with its operations (see [25, §17]), that is, for every a, a′, b, b′ ∈ A, if a ≡ a′
and b ≡ b′ then ¬a ≡ ¬a′, a ∧ b ≡ a′ ∧ b′ and a ∨ b ≡ a′ ∨ b′. The compatibility property
allows us to equip the set A/≡ = {[a] | a ∈ A} of equivalence classes with operations
inherited from A, endowing A/≡ with a structure of Boolean algebra, written A/≡, and
which is called the quotient of A modulo ≡. For a later use, we further recall that for all
a, a′ ∈ A such that a ≡ a′, the equality [a] = [a′] holds in A/≡. Recall that for any subset
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X ⊆ A×A, the congruence generated by X is the smallest congruence ≡X which contains
X. The congruence ≡X always exists [7, §5].
Boolean algebras form a variety, i.e. an equational class, in which, for any (countable)
set V , the free V -generated algebra Free(V ) (see [7, §II]) is isomorphic to the Lindenbaum
algebra of CPL over a language whose propositional variables belong to V (see for instance
[6]). Since these structures will play a quite important role in the main construction we
will introduce in Section 3, let us briefly recap on them. Given any set V of propositional
variables, we denote by L(V )/≡ the set of equivalence classes of formulas of the language
L(V ) modulo the congruence relation ≡ of equi-provability, i.e., two formulas ϕ and ψ are
equi-provable iff ⊢CPL ϕ ↔ ψ. The algebra L(V ) = (L(V )/≡,∧,∨,¬,⊥,⊤) is a Boolean
algebra called the Lindenbaum algebra of CPL over the language L(V ). Therefore, a map
v : L(V )→ {0, 1} is a valuation iff it is a homomorphism of L(V ) into 2 (where 2 denotes
the Boolean algebra of two elements {0, 1}).
Definition 2.1. An element a of a Boolean algebra A is said to be an atom of A if a > ⊥
and for any other element b ∈ A such that a ≥ b ≥ ⊥, either a = b or b = ⊥.
For every algebra A, we shall henceforth denote by at(A) the set of its atoms and
we will denote its elements by α, β, γ etc. If at(A) 6= ∅, A is called atomic, otherwise A
is said to be atomless. If A is finite, then it is atomic. In particular, if V is finite, the
Lindenbaum algebra L(V ) is finite as well and thus atomic [4]. In fact, if | · | denotes
the cardinality map, if |V | = n then |at(L(V ))| = 2n, and |L(V )| = 22
n
. The following
proposition collects well-known and needed facts about atoms (see e.g. [7, §I] and [29,
§16]). It recalls, among other things, that at(A) is a partition of an atomic algebra A.
Recall that a partition of a Boolean algebra is a collection of pairwise disjoint elements
different from ⊥ whose supremum is ⊤.
Proposition 2.2. Every finite Boolean algebra is atomic. Further, for every finite Boolean
algebra A the following hold:
(i) for every α, β ∈ at(A), α ∧ β = ⊥;
(ii) for every a ∈ A, a =
∨
α≤a α. Thus, in particular,
∨
α∈at(A) α = ⊤;
(iii) for each α ∈ at(A), the map hα : A → 2 such that hα(a) = 1 if a ≥ α and
hα(a) = 0 otherwise, is a homomorphism. Furthermore, the map λ : α 7→ hα is a
1-1 correspondence between at(A) and the set of homomorphisms of A in 2;
(iv) if A = L(V ) with V finite, the map λ as in (iii) is a 1-1 correspondence between the
atoms of L(V ) and the set Ω of valuations of V .
Moreover, a subset X = {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ A coincides with at(A) iff the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(a) X is a partition of A (i.e. xi ∧ xj = ⊥ if i 6= j, and
∨m
i=1 xi = ⊤);
(b) every xi ∈ X is such that ⊥ < xi and there is no b ∈ A such that ⊥ < b < xi.
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3 Boolean algebras of conditionals
In this section we introduce the notion of Boolean algebras of conditionals and prove some
basic properties. For any Boolean algebra A, the construction we are going to present
builds a Boolean algebra of conditionals that we shall denote by C(A). In the following,
given a Boolean algebra A, we will write A′ for A \ {⊥}.
Intuitively, in a Boolean algebra of conditionals over A we will allow basic conditionals,
i.e. objects of the form (a | b) for a ∈ A and b ∈ A′, to be freely combined with the usual
Boolean operations up to certain extent. Recall from the introduction that our main goal is
to distinguish, as far as this is possible, the properties of the uncertainty measure from the
algebraic properties of conditionals. This means that we must pin down properties which
make sense in the context of conditional reasoning under uncertainty. Those properties
are summed up in the following four informal requirements, which guide our construction.
R1 For every b ∈ A′, the conditional (b | b) will be the top element of C(A), while
(¬b | b) will be the bottom;
R2 Given b ∈ A′, the set of conditionals A | b = {(a | b) : a ∈ A} will be the domain of a
Boolean subalgebra of C(A), and in particular when b = ⊤, this subalgebra will be
isomorphic to A;
R3 In a conditional (a | b) we can replace the consequent a by a ∧ b, that is, we require
the conditionals (a | b) and (a ∧ b | b) to represent the same element of C(A);
R4 For all a ∈ A and all b, c ∈ A′, if a ≤ b ≤ c, then the result of conjunctively combining
the conditionals (a | b) and (b | c) must yield the conditional (a | c).
Whilst conditions R1-R3 do not require delving into particular justifications, it is worth
noting that R4 encodes a sort of restricted chaining of conditionals and it is inspired by the
chain rule of conditional probabilities: P (a | b) · P (b | c) = P (a | c) whenever a ≤ b ≤ c.
Given these four requirements, the formal construction of the algebra C(A) is done in
three steps described next.2
The first one is to consider the set of objects A | A = {(a | b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ A′} and the
algebra
Free(A | A) = (Free(A | A),⊓,⊔,∼,⊥∗,⊤∗).
Recall from Section 2 that Free(A | A) is (up to isomorphism) the Boolean algebra whose
elements are equivalence classes (modulo equi-provability) of Boolean terms generated by
all pairs (a | b) ∈ A | A taken as propositional variables. In other words, in Free(A | A)
two Boolean terms can be identified (i.e. they belong to the same class) only if one term can
be rewritten into the other one by using only the laws of Boolean algebras. For instance
(a | b) ⊓ (c | b) and (c | b) ⊓ (a | b) clearly belong to the same class in Free(A | A), but
(a ∧ c | b) does not, a fact that is not in agreement with requirement R2.
Therefore, in a second step, in order to accommodate the requirements R1-R4 above
we need to identify more classes in Free(A | A). In particular, we would like (a ∧ c | b),
(a | b)⊓(c | b) and (c | b)⊓(a | b) to represent the same element in the algebra C(A). Thus,
to enforce this and all the other desired identifications in Free(A | A), we consider the
congruence relation on Free(A | A) generated by the subset C ⊆ Free(A | A)× Free(A |
A) containing the following pairs of terms:
2Our construction is inspired by the one by Mundici for algebraic tensor products [43].
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(C1) ((b | b),⊤∗), for all b ∈ A′;
(C2) ((a1 | b) ⊓ (a2 | b), (a1 ∧ a2 | b)), for all a1, a2 ∈ A, b ∈ A
′;
(C3) (∼(a | b), (¬a | b)), for all a ∈ A, b ∈ A′;
(C4) ((a ∧ b | b), (a | b)), for all a ∈ A, b ∈ A′;
(C5) ((a | b) ⊓ (b | c), (a | c)), for all a ∈ A, b, c ∈ A′ such that a ≤ b ≤ c.
Note that (C1)-(C5) faithfully account for the requirements R1-R4 where, in particular,
(C2) and (C3) account for R2. In particular, observe that, continuing the discussion above,
now the elements (a ∧ c | b), (a | b) ⊓ (c | b) and (c | b) ⊓ (a | b) belong to the same class
under the equivalence ≡C.
Then, we finally propose the following definition.
Definition 3.1. For every Boolean algebra A, we define the Boolean algebra of condi-
tionals of A as the quotient structure
C(A) = Free(A | A)/≡C .
Note that, by construction, if A is finite, so is C(A). For the sake of an unambiguous
notation, we will henceforth distinguish the operations ofA from those of C(A) by adopting
the following signature:
C(A) = (C(A),⊓,⊔,∼,⊥C,⊤C).
Remark 3.2 (Notational convention). Since C(A) is a quotient of Free(A | A), its generic
element is a class [t]≡C , for t being a Boolean term, whose members are equivalent to t
under ≡C. For the sake of a clear notation and without danger of confusion, we will
henceforth identify [t]≡C with one of its representative elements and, in particular, by t
itself. Given two elements t1, t2 of C(A), we will write t1 = t2 meaning that t1 and t2
determine the same equivalence class of C(A) or, equivalently, that t1 ≡C t2.
It is then clear that, using the above notation convention, the following equalities,
which correspond to (C1)–(C5) above, hold in any Boolean algebra of conditionals C(A).
Proposition 3.3. Any Boolean algebra of conditionals C(A) satisfies the following prop-
erties for all a, a′ ∈ A and b, c ∈ A′:
(i) (b | b) = ⊤C;
(ii) (a | b) ⊓ (c | b) = (a ∧ c | b);
(iii) ∼(a | b) = (¬a | b);
(iv) (a ∧ b | b) = (a | b);
(v) if a ≤ b ≤ c, then (a | b) ⊓ (b | c) = (a | c).
Straightforward consequences of (iv) and (v) above are the following.
Corollary 3.4.
(i) (b→ a | b) = (a | b);
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(ii) (a ∧ b | ⊤) = (a | b) ⊓ (b | ⊤);
(iii) (a ∧ b | c) = (a | b ∧ c) ⊓ (b | c).
Notice that (iii) above corresponds to the qualitative version of axiom CP3 of [30,
Definition 3.2.3].
It is convenient to distinguish the elements of C(A) in basic and compound conditionals.
The former are expressions of the form (a | b), while the latter are those terms t which
are (non trivial) Boolean combination of basic conditionals but which are not equivalent
modulo ≡C (and hence not equal), to any element of C(A) of the form (a | b). For instance,
if b1 6= b2 ∈ A
′ there is no general rule, among (C1)–(C5) above, which allows us to identify
in C(A) the term (a | b1) ⊓ (a | b2) with a basic conditional of the form (x | y) whilst,
the term (a1 | b) ⊓ (a2 | b) coincides in C(A) with the basic conditional (a1 ∧ a2 | b), as
required by (C2).
Example 3.5. Let us consider the four elements Boolean algebra A whose domain is
{⊤, a,¬a,⊥}. Then, A | A = {(⊤,⊤), (⊤, a), (⊤,¬a), (a,⊤), (a, a), (a,¬a), (¬a,⊤),
(¬a, a), (¬a,¬a), (⊥,⊤), (⊥, a), (⊥,¬a)} has cardinality 12 and Free(A | A) is the free
Boolean algebra of 22
12
elements, i.e. the finite Boolean algebra of 212 atoms. However,
in C(A) the following equations hold (and the conditionals below are hence identified):
1. ⊤C = (⊤ | ⊤) = (a | ⊤) ⊔ (¬a | ⊤) = (⊤ | a) = (a | a) = (¬a | ¬a);
2. (⊤ | ⊤) ⊓ (a | ⊤) = (⊤ ∧ a | ⊤) = (a | ⊤) = ∼(¬a | ⊤);
3. (⊤ | ⊤) ⊓ (¬a | ⊤) = (⊤ ∧ ¬a | ⊤) = (¬a | ⊤) = ∼(a | ⊤);
4. ⊥C = ∼(⊤ | ⊤) = (⊥ | ⊤) = (a | ⊤) ⊓ (¬a | ⊤) = (a | ⊤) ⊓ ∼(a | ⊤).
Thus, it is easy to see that C(A) contains only four elements that are not redundant
under ≡C: (⊤ | ⊤), (a | ⊤), (¬a | ⊤), (⊥ | ⊤). As we will show in Section 4 (see Theorem
4.4) C(A) has 2 atoms and it is indeed isomorphic to A.
Next, we present some further basic properties of Boolean algebras of conditionals
which are not immediate from the construction. However, since their proofs are essentially
trivial, we also omit them.
Proposition 3.6. The following conditions hold in every Boolean algebra of conditionals
C(A):
(i) for all a, c ∈ A, (a | ⊤) = (c | ⊤) iff a = c;
(ii) for all b ∈ A′, (¬b | b) = ⊥C;
(iii) for all a, c ∈ A, and b ∈ A′, (a | b) ⊔ (c | b) = (a ∨ c | b);
For every fixed b ∈ A′, we can now consider the set A | b = {(a | b) | a ∈ A} of all
conditionals having b as antecedent. The following is an immediate consequence of (i-iii)
of Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.6 (iii) above.
Corollary 3.7. For every algebra C(A) and for every b ∈ A′ the structure A | b = (A |
b,⊓,⊔,¬,⊥C,⊤C) is a Boolean subalgebra of C(A). In particular, the algebra A | ⊤ is
isomorphic to A.
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As in any Boolean algebra, the lattice order relation in C(A), denoted by ≤, is defined
as follows: for every t1, t2 ∈ C(A),
t1 ≤ t2 iff t1 ⊓ t2 = t1 iff t1 ⊔ t2 = t2.
The following propositions collect some general properties related to the lattice order
≤ defined above. Nevertheless, some further and stronger properties on the ≤-relation
between basic conditionals will be provided at the end of Section 4, once the atomic
structure of the algebras of conditionals C(A) will be characterised in that section.
Proposition 3.8. In every algebra C(A) the following properties hold for every a, c ∈ A
and b ∈ A′:
(i) (a | b) ≥ (b | b) iff a ≥ b;
(ii) if a ≤ c, then (a | b) ≤ (c | b); in particular a ≤ c iff (a | ⊤) ≤ (c | ⊤);
(iii) if a ≤ b ≤ d, then (a | b) ≥ (a | d); in particular (a | b) ≥ (a | a ∨ b);
(iv) if (a | b) 6= (c | b), then a ∧ b 6= c ∧ b;
(v) (a ∧ b | ⊤) ≤ (a | b) ≤ (b→ a | ⊤);
(vi) if a ∧ d = ⊥ and ⊥ < a ≤ b, then (a | ⊤) ⊓ (d | b) = ⊥C;
(vii) (b | ⊤) ⊓ (a | b) ≤ (a | ⊤);
Proof. See Appendix.
Some properties in the proposition above have a clear logical reading. For instance,
(v) tells us that in a Boolean algebra of conditionals, a basic conditional (a | b) is a weaker
construct than the conjunction a ∧ b but stronger than the material implication b → a,
in accordance to previous considerations in the literature, see e.g. [17]. As a consequence,
this suggests that a conditional (a | b) can be evaluated to true when both b and a are
so (i.e. when a ∧ b is true), while (a | b) can be evaluated as false when a is false and b
is true (i.e. when falsifying b → a). Furthermore, (vii) can be read as a form of modus
ponens with respect to conditional expressions: from b and (a | b) it follows a. We refer
this discussion on logical issues of conditionals to Section 7 in which we will introduce and
study a logic of conditionals and where we will propose a formal definition of truth for
them.
We now end this section presenting a few further properties of Boolean algebras of
conditionals regarding the disjunction in the antecedents.
Proposition 3.9. In every algebra C(A) the following properties hold for all a, a′ ∈ A
and b, b′ ∈ A′:
(i) (a | b) ⊓ (a | b′) ≤ (a | b ∨ b′); in particular, (a | b) ⊓ (a | ¬b) ≤ (a | ⊤);
(ii) if a ≤ b ∧ b′, then (a | b) ⊓ (a | b′) = (a | b ∨ b′);
(iii) (a | b) ≤ (b→ a | b ∨ b′);
(iv) (a | b) ⊓ (a′ | b′) ≤ ((b→ a) ∧ (b′ → a′) | b ∨ b′).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Observe that the logical reading of property (i) above is the well-known OR-rule,
typical of nonmonotonic reasoning (see [2, 17]). This fact, although not being particularly
surprising, will be further strengthened in Section 7 where we will show that, indeed,
Boolean algebras of conditionals provide a sort of algebraic semantics for a nonmonotonic
logic related to System P. Further, (iv) shows that the algebraic conjunction of two basic
conditionals is stronger than the operation of quasi-conjunction introduced in the setting
of measure-free conditionals (see [2] and [17, Lemma 2]) and recalled in Subsection 8.1.
Also notice that, the point (iv) above, in the special case in which a′ = b, b′ = c and
a ≤ b ≤ c actually gives (a | b) ⊓ (b | c) = (a | c) = ((b → a) ∧ (c → b) | b ∨ c). Therefore,
the requirement R4 is in agreement with the definition of quasi-conjunction.
4 The atoms of a Boolean algebra of conditionals
As we already noticed, if A is finite, C(A) is finite as well and hence atomic. This section
is devoted to investigate the atomic structure of finite Boolean algebras of conditionals. In
particular, in Subsection 4.1 we provide a characterization of the atoms of C(A) in terms
of the atoms of A. That characterization will be employed in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 to
give, respectively, a full description of the atoms which stand below a basic conditional
(a | b) and to prove results concerning equalities and inequalities among conditionals which
improve those of Section 3.
In this section and in rest of the paper, we will only deal with finite Boolean algebras.
4.1 The atomic structure of C(A)
Let us recall the notation introduced in Section 2: for every Boolean algebra A, we denote
by at(A) the set of its atoms, that will be denoted by lower-case greek letters, α, β, γ etc.
Proposition 4.1. In a conditional algebra C(A), the following hold:
(i) each element t of C(A) is of the form t =
d
i(
⊔
j(aij | bij ));
(ii) each basic conditional is of the form (a | b) =
⊔
α≤a(α | b);
(iii) in particular, every element of C(A) is a ⊓-⊔ combination of basic conditionals in
the form (α |
∨
X) where α ∈ at(A) and X ⊆ at(A).
Proof. (i). It readily follows by recalling that (1) every element t of C(A) is, by construc-
tion, a Boolean combination of basic conditionals, (2) it can be expressed in conjunctive
normal form, and (3) the negation of a basic conditional (a | b) is the basic conditional
(¬a | b).
(ii). The claim directly follows from Proposition 3.6 (iii) taking into account that a =∨
α≤a α (recall Proposition 2.2 (ii)).
(iii). It is a direct consequence of (i) and (ii).
Now, let A be a Boolean algebra with n atoms, i.e. |at(A)| = n. For each i ≤ n−1, let
us define Seqi(A) to be the set of sequences 〈α1, α2, . . . , αi〉 of i pairwise different elements
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of at(A). Thus, for every α = 〈α1, α2, . . . , αi〉 ∈ Seqi(A), let us consider the compound
conditional of C(A) defined in the following way:
ωα = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (αi | ¬α1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αi−1). (1)
Intuitively, such a conjunction of conditonals encodes a sort of chained ‘defeasible’
conditional statements about a set of mutually disjoint events: in principle α1 holds, but
if α1 turns out to be false then in principle α2 holds, but if besides α2 turns out to be false
as well, then in principle α3 holds, and so on . . .
These conjunctions of basic conditionals will play an important role in describing the
atomic structure of C(A) and enjoy suitable properties. To begin with, let us consider sets
of those compound conditionals of a given length: for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, let
Parti(C(A)) = {ωα | α ∈ Seqi(A)}.
Example 4.2. Let A be the Boolean algebra with 4 atoms, at(A) = {α1, . . . , α4}. For
i = 1, the set Part1(C(A)) is easily built by considering all sequences of length 1 of atoms
of A, Seq1(C(A)) = {〈α1〉, 〈α2〉, 〈α3〉, 〈α4〉}, and hence:
Part1(C(A)) = {ω〈α1〉, . . . , ω〈α4〉} = {(α1 | ⊤), . . . , (α4 | ⊤)}.
For i = 2, we have to consider sequences of atoms of length 2, i.e.
Seq2(C(A)) = {〈α1, α2〉, 〈α1, α3, 〉, 〈α1, α4〉, 〈α2, α3〉, . . .},
and then the corresponding set Part2(C(A)) is composed by 12 Boolean terms like
ω〈α1,α2〉 = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1); ω〈α1,α3〉 = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α3 | ¬α1);
ω〈α1,α4〉 = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α4 | ¬α1); ω〈α2,α3〉 = (α2 | ⊤) ⊓ (α3 | ¬α2);
. . .
Finally, for i = 3, consider the set sequences of atoms of length 3,
Seq3(C(A)) = {〈α1, α2, α3〉, 〈α1, α2, α4〉, 〈α2, α1, α3〉, . . .}.
Therefore, the set Part3(C(A)) contains 24 Boolean terms:
ω〈α1,α2,α3〉 = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1) ⊓ (α3 | ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2);
ω〈α1,α2,α4〉 = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1) ⊓ (α4 | ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2);
ω〈α2,α1,α3〉 = (α2 | ⊤) ⊓ (α1 | ¬α2) ⊓ (α3 | ¬α2 ∧ ¬α1);
. . .
The following result shows that, for each i, Parti(C(A)) is a partition of C(A)(recall
Section 2), and the higher the index i, the more refined the partition is.
Proposition 4.3. Parti(C(A)) is a partition of C(A).
Proof. See Appendix.
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As we already saw in Example 4.2, if at(A) = {α1, . . . , αn}, then Part1(C(A)) =
{(α1 | ⊤), . . . , (αn | ⊤)} and it gives the coarsest partition among those that we denoted
by Parti(C(A)).
In the following, if |at(A)| = n, for simplicity, we will write Seq(A) and Part(C(A))
instead of Seqn−1(A) and Partn−1(C(A)) respectively. Note that in this case, for every
α = 〈α1, α2, . . . , αn−1〉 ∈ Seq(A), the compound conditional ωα defined as in (1), can be
equivalently written as
ωα = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | α2 ∨ · · · ∨ αn) ⊓ (α3 | α3 ∨ . . . ∨ αn) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (αn−1 | αn−1 ∨ αn).
Next theorem shows that these conditionals are in fact the atoms of C(A).
Theorem 4.4. Let A be a Boolean algebra such that |at(A)| = n. Then,
at(C(A)) = {ωα | α ∈ Seq(A)} = Part(C(A)).
As a consequence, |at(C(A))| = n! and |C(A)| = 2n!.
Proof. To show that Part(C(A)) coincides with at(C(A)), by Proposition 2.2, we have to
prove the following two conditions:
(a) Part(C(A)) is a partition of C(A).
(b) Any ωα ∈ Part(C(A)) is such that ⊥C < ωα and there is no t ∈ C(A) such that
⊥C < t < ωα.
It is clear that (a) is just the case i = n− 1 in Proposition 4.3. As for (b), note first that
each ωα ∈ Part(C(A)) is different from ⊥C. Indeed, it follows from (a) and a symmetry
argument on the elements of Part(C(A)). Thus, it is enough to show that, if t is any
element of C(A) which is not ⊥C, then either t ⊓ ωα = ωα, or t ⊓ ωα = ⊥C. We show this
claim by cases on the form of t:
(i) Assume t is basic conditional of the form t = (γ | b) with γ ∈ at(A). Let α =
〈α1, α2, . . . , αn−1〉. Since γ ∈ at(A), then γ = αi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we have
two cases: either b = αi ∨ · · · ∨ αn, and in that case ωα ⊓ (γ | b) = ωα, or otherwise
b is of the form b = αi ∨ αk ∨ c, for some k < i and some c ∈ A. If the latter is the
case, we have (γ | b)⊓ (αk | αk ∨ . . .∨αn) = (αi | αi ∨αk ∨ c)⊓ (αk | αk ∨ . . .∨αn) ≤
(αi | αi ∨ αk) ⊓ (αk | αk ∨ αi) = ⊥C, and hence (γ | b) ⊓ ωα = ⊥C as well.
(ii) Assume t is a basic conditional t = (a | b). By (ii) of Proposition 4.1, we can express
(a | b) =
⊔
α∈at(A):α≤a(α | b). Hence, ωα ⊓ (a | b) =
⊔
γ ωα ⊓ (γ | b), but by (i), for
each γ, ωα ⊓ (γ | b) is either ωα or ⊥C. So this is also the case for ωα ⊓ t.
(iii) Finally, assume t is an arbitrary element of C(A). By Proposition 4.1 above, t is a ⊓-
⊔ combination of basic conditionals, i.e. it can be displayed as t =
d
i(
⊔
j(aij | bij )).
Then we have
ωα ⊓ t = ωα ⊓

l
i

⊔
j
(aij | bij)



 = l
i

⊔
j
ωα ⊓ (aij | bij)

 .
By (ii), each ωα ⊓ (aij | bij ) is either equal to ⊥C or to ωα, and hence so is ωα ⊓ t.
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α1
α2 α3
⊥
¬α1¬α3 ¬α2
⊤
Figure 1: The Boolean algebra with 3 atoms and 8 elements.
Therefore, we have proved that Part(C(A)) = at(C(A)).
Example 4.5. Let A be the Boolean algebra of 3 atoms α1, α2, α3, and 8 elements, see
Figure 1. Theorem 4.4 tells us that the atoms of the conditional algebra C(A) are as
follows:
at(C(A)) = {(αi | ⊤) ⊓ (αj | ¬αi) : i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j}.
Therefore, C(A) has six atoms and 26 = 64 elements (see Figure 2). In particular, the
atoms are:
ω1 = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1), ω2 = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α3 | ¬α1),
ω3 = (α2 | ⊤) ⊓ (α1 | ¬α2), ω4 = (α2 | ⊤) ⊓ (α3 | ¬α2),
ω5 = (α3 | ⊤) ⊓ (α1 | ¬α3), ω6 = (α3 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α3).
Notice that ω1 ⊔ ω2 = (α1 | ⊤). Indeed, ((α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1)) ⊔ ((α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α3 |
¬α1)) = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 ∨ α3 | ¬α1) = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (¬α1 | ¬α1) = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ ⊤C = (α1 | ⊤).
Analogously, we can also derive ω3 ⊔ ω4 = (α2 | ⊤) and ω5 ⊔ ω6 = (α3 | ⊤).
Now, let us consider the conditional t = (α1 | ¬α3). Obviously, t =
⊔
{ωi : ωi ≤ t} and
thanks to Proposition 3.8, we can check that
t = ω1 ⊔ ω2 ⊔ ω5.
As a matter of fact, since ω1 ⊔ ω2 = (α1 | ⊤), we have
ω1⊔ω2⊔ω5 = (α1 | ⊤)⊔((α3 | ⊤)⊓(α1 | ¬α3)) = ((α1 | ⊤)⊔(α3 | ⊤))⊓((α1 | ⊤)⊔(α1 | ¬α3)).
Now, (α1 | ⊤) ⊔ (α3 | ⊤) = (α1 ∨ α3 | ⊤) = (¬α3 → α1 | ⊤), while Proposition 3.8 (iii)
implies that (α1 | ⊤) ⊔ (α1 | ¬α3) = (α1 | ¬α3) because α1 ≤ ¬α3 ≤ ⊤. Finally, by
Proposition 3.8 (v) (α1 | ¬α3) ≤ (¬α3 → α1 | ⊤) and hence ω1 ⊔ ω2 ⊔ ω5 = (α1 | ¬α3) =
t.
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⊥C
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 ω5 ω6
t
(α1 | ⊤)
(α2 | ⊤)
(α3 | ⊤)
⊤C
Figure 2: The algebra of conditionals C(A) of Example 4.5, where at(A) = {α1, α2, α3} and
at(C(A)) = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6}. The element t = (α1 | ¬α3) (squared node) is obtained as
ω1 ⊔ ω2 ⊔ ω5. The atoms of C(A) are marked by grey dots, while the elements a of the original
algebra A, regarded as conditionals (a | ⊤), correspond to the bigger black dots.
Thanks to Theorem 4.4 and without danger of confusion, for every sequence α ∈
Seq(A), we will henceforth denote by ωα the atom of C(A) which is uniquely associated
to the sequence α.
A simple argument about the cardinality of Boolean algebras shows that not every
finite Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a finite Boolean algebra of conditionals. In fact,
from Theorem 4.4, there is no Boolean algebras of conditionals of cardinality different from
2n! for every n whence, for instance, there is no Boolean algebra of conditionals with 28
elements. Therefore, the class of all finite Boolean algebras of conditionals forms a proper
subset of the class of all finite Boolean algebras. The following corollary shows that the
cardinality of a finite Boolean algebra is enough to describe it as an isomorphic copy of
some C(A).
Corollary 4.6. Let B be a Boolean algebra of cardinality 2n!. Then there exists a Boolean
algebra A of cardinality 2n such that B ∼= C(A).
Proof. Let β1, . . . , βn! be the atoms of B and let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a partition of at(B)
in subsets of (n−1)! elements. For every Pi = {βi1 , . . . , βi(n−1)!}, let ai =
∨(n−1)!
j=1 βij . Since
P is a partition, if ai 6= aj , then ai∧aj = ⊥B and
∨n
i=1 ai = ⊤B. Thus, the subalgebra AP
of B generated by a1, . . . , an is such that at(AP) = {a1, . . . , an}. Notice, that, if P and
P ′ are two different partitions of at(B) in subsets of cardinality (n− 1)!, then AP ∼= AP ′ .
Thus, C(AP ) ∼= B since |at(C(AP ))| = |at(B)|.
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4.2 Characterising the atoms below a basic conditional
Now, we will be concerned with the description of the set of atoms of C(A) below (according
to the lattice ordering in C(A)) a given basic conditional (a | b). In general, for every
Boolean algebra B and for every b ∈ B, we will henceforth write at≤(b) to denote the
subset of at(B) below b. Thus, in particular, for every (a | b) ∈ C(A),
at≤(a | b) = {ωα ∈ at(C(A)) | ωα ≤ (a | b)}.
Proposition 4.7. Let A be a Boolean algebra, let α = 〈α1, α2, . . . , αn−1〉 ∈ Seq(A) and
let (a | b) ∈ C(A) be such that a ≤ b. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) ωα ∈ at≤(a | b);
(ii) there is an index i ≤ n− 1 such that αj ≤ ¬b for all j < i and αi ≤ a;
(iii) αi ≤ a for the smallest index i ≤ n− 1 such that αi ≤ b.
Proof. Let us start by showing that (ii) implies (i). Since ωα ≤ (a | b) =
∨
β≤a(β | b) iff
ωα ≤ (β | b) for some β ≤ a, it is sufficient to prove the claim for the case in which a = β.
In such a case, if αi = β and ¬α1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αi−1 ≥ b then, since a ≤ b and αi = β = a, one
has b ≥ αi whence ¬α1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αi−1 ≥ b ≥ αi. Therefore, by Proposition 3.8 (iii),
(αi | ¬α1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αi−1) ≤ (αi | b) = (β | b),
and hence ωα = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (αi | ¬α1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αi−1) ⊓ · · · ≤ (β | b) as well.
To prove the other direction, (i) implies (ii), we consider two cases:
(a) There is i ≤ n − 1 such that αi = β. If i = 1, since ⊤ ≥ b, then the claim is fulfilled.
Thus, assume i > 1 and ωα ⊓ (β | b) = ωα, and let us prove ¬α1 ∧ . . .∧¬αi−1 ≥ b. Indeed,
we have the following subcases:
• If α1 ≤ b, we would have (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (β | b) ≤ (α1 | b) ⊓ (αi | b) = ⊥C, and hence
ωα ⊓ (β | b) = ⊥C, contradiction. Therefore α1 ≤ ¬b.
• If α2 ≤ b, since α1 ≤ ¬b, we would have (α2 | ¬α1)⊓ (β | b) ≤ (α2 | b)⊓ (β | b) = ⊥C,
and hence ωα ⊓ (β | b) = ⊥C, contradiction. Therefore, α2 ≤ ¬b.
. . .
• If αi−1 ≤ b, since α1 ≤ ¬b, α2 ≤ ¬b, . . . , αi−2 ≤ ¬b, we would have (αi−1 |
¬α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αi−2) ⊓ (β | b) ≤ (α2 | b) ⊓ (β | b) = ⊥C, and hence ωα ⊓ (β | b) = ⊥,
contradiction. Therefore, αi−1 ≤ ¬b.
As a consequence, α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αi−1 ≤ ¬b or, equivalently, ¬α1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αi−1 ≥ b.
(b) β = αn, where αn is the remaining atom not appearing in α. In this case, one can
show that ωα ⊓ (β | b) = ⊥C, and hence ωα 6≤ (β | b). Indeed, if β = αn < b, it means that
b ≥ αi∨αn, with i ≤ n−1. Then, the expression (αi | ¬α1∧. . .¬αi−1) = (αi | αi∨. . .∨αn)
appears as a conjunct in the atom ωα. Thus, ωα ⊓ (β | b) ≤ (αi | αi ∨ . . . ∨ αn) ⊓ (β | b) ≤
(αi | αi ∨ αn) ⊓ (β | αi ∨ αn) = ⊥C.
Finally, notice that (iii) is just an equivalent rewriting of (ii) observing that if αi ≤ a
then αi ≤ b as well, since we are assuming a ≤ b.
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As a consequence of the above characterisation, one can compute the number of atoms
below a given conditional.
Corollary 4.8. Let A be a Boolean algebra with |at(A)| = n. For every basic conditional
(a | b) ∈ C(A) with a ≤ b, |at≤(a | b)| = n! ·
|at≤(a)|
|at≤(b)|
.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.3 Equalities and inequalities among conditionals
The results proved in the previous subsections allow us to determine when two basic
conditionals are equal. Further, in this subsection, we will investigate properties regarding
the order among conditionals which improve those of Section 3. Let us start with two
preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 4.9. Let a, b, c ∈ A be such that ⊥ < a < b and a < c. Then (a | b) ≥ (a | c) iff
b ≤ c.
Proof. One direction is easy. If b ≤ c then b ∨ c = c, and by Proposition 3.9 (ii), we have
(a | b) ⊓ (a | c) = (a | b ∨ c) = (a | c), that is, (a | b) ≥ (a | c).
As for the other, let α be an atom of A such that α ≤ a. If b  c, there is an atom
β such that β ≤ b but β 6≤ c (and thus β 6≤ a). Then let ωβ ∈ at(C(A)) be of the form
ωβ = (β | ⊤) ⊓ (α | ¬β) ⊓ . . .. Then it follows that ωβ ≤ (a | c), since β  c and both
α ≤ c and α ≤ a, but ωβ 6≤ (a | b), since β ≤ b but β  a. Hence (a | b)  (a | c).
As a direct consequence of this lemma, we have the following property that strengthens
Proposition 3.6 (i).
Corollary 4.10. Let a, b, c ∈ A be such that ⊥ < a < b and a < c. Then (a | b) = (a | c)
iff b = c.
Lemma 4.11. Let a, b, c, d ∈ A be such that ⊥ < a < b and ⊥ < c < d. Then (a | b) =
(c | d) iff a = c and b = d.
Proof. One direction is trivial. As for the other, assume a 6= c, and hence there is an atom
α of A such that α ≤ a but α 6≤ c. Further, since c < d there exists an atom γ of A such
that γ ≤ d but γ  c. Consider any atom ωα of C(A) of the form ωα = (α | ⊤) ⊓ (γ |
¬α) ⊓ . . .. Then, using Proposition 4.7, one can check that ωα ≤ (a | b) since α ≤ a, but
ωα 6≤ (c | d) since α  c and both γ ≤ d and γ  c. Therefore, there are atoms below
(a | b) that are not below (c | d), hence (a | b) 6= (c | d), contradiction. Hence, it must be
a = c.
Finally, we apply Corollary 4.10 to get b = d as well.
As a consequence of the above two lemmas, we can provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for the equality between two basic conditionals.
Theorem 4.12. For any pair of conditionals (a | b), (c | d) ∈ C(A), we have (a | b) = (c |
d) iff either (a | b) = (c | d) = ⊤, or (a | b) = (c | d) = ⊥, or a ∧ b = c ∧ d and b = d.
Thanks to the characterisation Theorem 4.12, one can easily compute the number of
(distinct) basic conditionals in a given algebra of conditionals C(A). Indeed, to compute
the number of basic conditionals different from ⊤ and ⊥ amounts to counting all pairs
(M,N) with ∅ 6=M ⊂ N ⊆ at(A).
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Corollary 4.13. Let A be a Boolean algebra with n atoms, i.e. with |at(A)| = n. Then
the number of basic conditionals in C(A) is bc(n) = 2 +
∑n
r=2
(
n
r
)
· (2r − 2).
Proof. The counting of pairs (M,N) with ∅ 6=M ⊂ N ⊆ at(A) results from the following
observations:
(1) For each N with r elements, there are 2r − 2 non-empty subsets M of N with less
than r elements (note that necessarily |N | ≥ 2 since ∅ 6=M ⊂ N);
(2) Hence, there are
(
n
r
)
· (2r − 2) such pairs (M,N) such that |N | = r;
(3) Thus, the total number of such pairs will be
n∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
· (2r − 2).
Finally, to get the total number of basic conditionals we only need to add 2 (for the ⊥
and ⊤ conditionals) to the above quantity.
For example, in the algebra C(A) of Fig. 2, built from the algebra A with 3 atoms
(n = 3), we have bc(3) = 14 basic conditionals, out of 64 elements in total. Hence it
contains 50 proper compound conditionals.
Thanks to the results about the atomic structure of the algebras of conditionas C(A),
we can now also provide similar, but partial, characterisation results of when an inequality
between two basic conditionals holds, stronger than those shown e.g. in Proposition 3.8.
Lemma 4.14. Let a, b, c, d ∈ A be such that ⊥ < a < b, ⊥ < c < d. Then:
(i) if a ≤ c and b ≥ d then (a | b) ≤ (c | d);
(ii) if (a | b) ≤ (c | d) then a ≤ c;
(iii) if c ≤ b and (a | b) ≤ (c | d) then b ≥ d.
Proof. (i) Assume a ≤ c and b ≥ d. In such a case we have ⊥ < c ∧ b < b. Indeed,
if it were c ∧ b = b, it would mean b ≤ c, and then we would have a < b ≤ c < d,
hence b < d that is in contradiction with the hypothesis b ≥ d. Therefore we have
the following chain of inequalities:
(a | b) ≤ (c | b) = (c ∧ b | b) ≤ (c ∧ b | d) ≤ (c | d).
Observe that the first and third inequalities are clear from (iii) of Proposition 3.8,
while the second one follows from Lemma 4.9 due to the fact that c ∧ b < b and
c ∧ d < d.
(ii) Assume a  c, and hence assume there is an atom α of A such that α ≤ a but
α 6≤ c. Further, since c < d there exists an atom γ of A such that γ ≤ d but γ  c.
Consider any atom ωα of C(A) of the form ωα = (α | ⊤) ⊓ (γ | ¬α) ⊓ . . .. Then,
using Proposition 4.7, one can check that ωα ≤ (a | b) since α ≤ a, but ωα 6≤ (c | d)
since α  c and both γ ≤ d and γ  c. Therefore, (a | b)  (c | d).
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(iii) Assume b  d. In this case, we can further assume a ≤ c, otherwise the previous
item can be applied. Let α be an atom of A such that α ≤ a, and hence α ≤ b and
α ≤ c ≤ d as well.
If b  d, there is an atom β such that β ≤ d but β 6≤ b (and thus β 6≤ a and
β 6≤ c as well since a < b and c ≤ b). Then let ωβ ∈ at(C(A)) be of the form
ωβ = (β | ⊤)⊓ (α | ¬β)⊓ . . .. Then it follows that ωβ ≤ (a | b), since β  b and both
α ≤ a and α ≤ b, but ωβ 6≤ (c | d), since β ≤ d but β  c. Therefore, (a | b)  (c | d).
Note that the property (i) in the above lemma is stronger than both (ii) and (iii) of
Proposition 3.8.
From these properties, we can express the following characterisation result, although
with an additional assumption (the one in (iii) above) that restricts the scope of its appli-
cation. It remains as an open problem whether this extra condition could be eventually
removed.
Corollary 4.15. For any pair of conditionals (a | b), (c | d) ∈ C(A) such that c ∧ d ≤ b,
we have (a | b) ≤ (c | d) iff either (c | d) = ⊤, (a | b) = ⊥, or a ∧ b ≤ c ∧ d and b ≥ d.
5 Two tree-like representations of at(C(A))
In this section we provide two representations of the set at(C(A)) of atoms of a conditional
Boolean algebra as trees that will turn very helpful in the proof of the main result of next
Section 6.2. We advise readers who are not interested in the full detail of the proof to
skim through this section to get acquainted with the notation, which will be useful later
on.
5.1 A first representation
LetA be a Boolean algebra with n atoms, say at(A) = {α1, . . . , αn}, and let us inductively
define the following rooted trees T(m) of increasing depth, for m = 0, 1, . . . , n:
(0) T(0) consists of only one node: (⊤ | ⊤).
(1) T(1) is obtained from T(0) by attaching the following n child nodes to (⊤ | ⊤):
(α1 | ⊤), . . . , (αn | ⊤).
(k) For k = 1, . . . , n − 2, T(k + 1) is obtained by spanning T(k) in the following way.
For each leaf (αi | b) of T(k), let Atup(αi, b) be the set of atoms that appear in the
consequents of conditionals along the path from (αi | b) to the root, including αi
itself. Then attach (αi | b) with the n− k child nodes of the form (αj | b ∧ ¬αi), for
each αj ∈ at(A) \Atup(αi, b).
(n− 1) Put T = T(n− 1).3
Figure 5.1 clarifies the above construction in the case of an algebra A with four atoms.
The following hold:
3In the above construction, if we would proceed to the stage n, the leaves of T(n) would be of the form
(αj |
∧
αi 6=αj
¬αi) = (αj | αj) = (⊤ | ⊤). For this reason, and in order not to trivialize the construction,
we stop the definition at level n− 1.
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Fact 1: all the conditionals appearing in T, but the root, are of the form (αi | b) for αi ∈
at(A) and b ∈ A;
Fact 2: at each level of the tree, all conditionals which are children of the same node share the
same antecedent. For instance the leafs of T(k+1) are all of the form (αj | b∧¬αi),
for each αj ∈ at(A) \Atup(αi, b) (see the construction above).
Fact 3: there is a bijective correspondence between the atoms of C(A) and the paths from
the root to the leaves in T.
α1 | ⊤
α2 | ¬α1 α1 | ¬α2
α2 | ⊤ α3 | ⊤ α4 | ⊤
⊤ | ⊤
α3 | ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2
Figure 3: The tree T = T(3) whose 24 paths describe the atoms of C(A) with |at(A)| = 4. In
particular, notice that the left-most path (dashed in the figure) provides a description for the atom
ωα = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1) ⊓ (α3 | ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2) where α = 〈α1, α2, α3〉.
5.2 A second representation
Let A be such that at(A) = {α1, . . . , αn}. Consider a basic conditional of the form (α | b),
with α ∈ at(A). Without loss of generality, we will henceforth assume α = α1. In what
follows, we provide another description of at≤(α1 | b), alternative to the one given in
Proposition 4.7. To this end, let us start introducing the following notation: for every
j = 1, . . . , n, let Sj be the subset of atoms of C(A) below (α1 | b) whose first conjunct is
(αj | ⊤), that is, equivalently,
Sj = {ωγ | γ = 〈γ1, . . . , γn−1〉 ∈ Seq(A), ωα ≤ (α1 | b) and γ1 = αj}. (2)
Obviously at≤(α1 | b) =
⋃n
j=1 Sj. Moreover, by construction, the sets Sj satisfy the
following properties.
Lemma 5.1. For every basic conditional of the form (α1 | b), the family {Sj}j=1,...,n is a
partition of at≤(α1 | b). Further, the following properties hold:
(i) S1 = {ωγ | 〈γ1, . . . , γn−1〉 ∈ Seq(A), γ1 = α1}.
(ii) For every j ≥ 2, if αj ≤ b, then Sj = ∅.
Proof. We already noticed that at≤(α1 | b) =
⋃n
j=1 Sj and moreover, it is immediate to
check that, for j1 6= j2, Sj1 ∩ Sj2 = ∅. Thus, it is left to prove (i) and (ii).
(i). It is clear that any atom with first coordinate α1 is below (α1 | b) since (α1 | ⊤)⊓ (β2 |
¬α1) ⊓ . . . ≤ (α1 | ⊤) ≤ (α1 | b).
(ii). It follows from Proposition 4.7.
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For every pair of sequences of symbols σ1, σ2, we will write σ1 ≪ σ2 to denote that σ1
is an initial segment of σ2.
Definition 5.2. Let A be a Boolean algebra with n atoms and let 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Then,
for any sequence α = 〈α1, . . . , αi〉 ∈ Seqi(A), we define:
Jα1, . . . , αiK = {ωγ ∈ at(C(A)) | 〈α1, . . . , αi〉 ≪ γ}.
In other words, Jα1, . . . , αiK denotes the subset of atoms of C(A) of the form ωγ , with
γ = 〈γ1, . . . , γn−1〉 where γ1 = α1, . . . , γi = αi.
Proposition 5.3. Let A be a Boolean algebra with atoms α1, . . . , αn, and let b ∈ A be
such that ¬b = β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βk with βk = αn. For every t = 2, . . . , k − 1, let Πt denote the
set of all permutations π : {1, . . . , t} → {1, . . . , t}. Then,
Sn = Jαn, α1K ∪
k−1⋃
i=1
Jαn, βi, α1K ∪
k−1⋃
t=2
⋃
π∈Πt
Jαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), α1K.
Proof. Immediate consequence of the definition of Jαn, α1K, Jαn, βi, α1K and Jαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), α1K.
Obviously, renaming the indexes of the atoms of A, the above proposition provides a
description for all Sj’s. However, we preferred to show the case of Sn since that will be
the case we shall need in Subsection 6.2.
Let us start defining a tree whose nodes are sets of atoms in Sn as in Proposition 5.3
above. Further, keeping the same notation as in the statement of Proposition 5.3 above,
we denote by β1, . . . , βk the elements of at≤(¬b) and βk = αn.
Definition 5.4. With the above premises, we define the tree B in the following inductive
way.
0. The root of B is Jαn, α1K.
1. The child nodes of Jαn, α1K are Jαn, β1, α1K, . . . , Jαn, βk−1, α1K.
. . .
t. The child nodes of Jαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), α1K are Jαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), βl1 , α1K,
. . . , Jαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), βlm , α1K, where {βl1 , . . . , βlm} = {β1, . . . , βk−1}\{βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t)}.
Given any node Jαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), α1K of B, we will henceforth denote by BJαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), α1K
the subtree of B generated by Jαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), α1K.
We clarify the above construction with the following example.
Example 5.5. In order not to trivialize the example, let us consider the algebra C(A)
with at(A) = {α1, . . . , α5}. Let b = α1 ∨ α2, whence ¬b = α3 ∨ α4 ∨ α5, and S5 = {ωγ ∈
at(C(α)) | γ1 = α5, ωγ ≤ (α1 | b)}. Then, according to the above definition, we first need
to consider the following subsets of S5:
Jα5, α1K = {ωγ | 〈5, 1〉 ≪ γ} =
{ωγ | γ ∈ {〈5, 1, 2, 3〉, 〈5, 1, 2, 4〉, 〈5, 1, 3, 2〉, 〈5, 1, 4, 2〉, 〈5, 1, 3, 4〉, 〈5, 1, 4, 3〉}};
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Jα5, α3, α1K = {ωγ | 〈5, 3, 1〉 ≪ γ} = {ωγ | γ ∈ {〈5, 3, 1, 2〉, 〈5, 3, 1, 4〉}};
Jα5, α4, α1K = {ωγ | 〈5, 4, 1〉 ≪ γ} = {ωγ | γ ∈ {〈5, 4, 1, 2〉, 〈5, 4, 1, 3〉}};
Jα5, α3, α4, α1K = {ωγ | γ = 〈5, 3, 4, 1〉};
Jα5, α4, α3, α1K = {ωγ | γ = 〈5, 4, 3, 1〉}.
It is now clear that S5 = Jα5, α1K∪Jα5, α3, α1K∪Jα5, α4, α1K∪Jα5, α3, α4, α1K∪Jα5, α4, α3, α1K.
The resulting tree B is hence depicted as in Figure 5.2.
Jα5, α1K
Jα5, α3, α1K Jα5, α4, α1K
Jα5, α3, α4, α1K Jα5, α4, α3, α1K
Figure 4: The tree B for S5 when A has 5 atoms and b = α1 ∨ α2.
6 Probabilities on Boolean algebras of conditionals
With the desired Boolean algebraic structure for conditionals in place, we are now in a
position to tackle the main issue of this paper which is the relation between conditional
probability functions on a Boolean algebra A and simple (i.e. “unconditional”) probabil-
ities on the conditional algebra C(A). In the following subsections we shall address two
questions that go in the direction of clarifying when, and under which conditions, a prob-
ability function on a conditional algebra can be regarded as a conditional probability. In
particular, in Subsection 6.1 we will determine under which conditions a simple measure
on C(A) satisfies the axioms of a conditional probability function on A, while in Subsec-
tion 6.2 we will prove our main result, namely, a canonical way to define a simple measure
on C(A) which agrees on each basic conditional with a given conditional probability on
A.
6.1 Preliminary observations about probabilities on C(A)
We assume the reader to be familiar with the usual and well-known notion of (simple
or unconditional) finitely-additive probability. Let us recall the notion of a conditional
probability map which we take, with inessential variations, from [30, Definition 3.2.3]. See
also [44] and [12] where conditional probability was firstly considered as a primitive notion.
Definition 6.1. For a Boolean algebra A, a two-place function CP : A × A′ → [0, 1], is
a conditional probability if it satisfies the following conditions, where we write, as usual,
(x | y) instead of (x, y):
(CP1) for all b ∈ A′, CP (b | b) = 1;
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(CP2) if a1, a2 ∈ A, a1 ∧ a2 = 0 and b ∈ A
′, CP (a1 ∨ a2 | b) = CP (a1 | b) + CP (a2 | b);
(CP3) if a ∈ A and b ∈ A′, CP (a | b) = CP (a ∧ b | b);
(CP4) if a ∈ A and b, c ∈ A′ with a ≤ b ≤ c, then CP (a | c) = CP (a | b) · CP (b | c).
In what follows, for the sake of a simpler notation, if µ : C(A) → [0, 1] is a (uncondi-
tional) probability we will write µ(a | b) instead of µ((a | b)).
Remark 6.2. Take any probability µ on C(A) and fix an element b ∈ A′. Then, A | b is
a Boolean subalgebra of C(A) from Corollary 3.7, and the restriction µb of µ to A | b is a
probability measure. Notice that µb also satisfies axiom (CP3).
Therefore, a simple probability on C(A), once restricted to basic conditionals, always
satisfies properties (CP1), (CP2) and (CP3) above. However, axiom (CP4), also known
as chain rule, does not always hold as we show in the next example.
Example 6.3. In the conditional algebra C(A) of Example 4.5, consider the elements
(α1 | ⊤), (α1 | α1 ∨ α2) and (α1 ∨ α2 | ⊤). Clearly, in the Boolean algebra A, we have
α1 ≤ α1 ∨ α2 ≤ ⊤ and hence (α1 | ⊤) = (α1 | α1 ∨ α2) ⊓ (α1 ∨ α2 | ⊤) by Proposition 3.3
(v). As usual, for every element t ∈ C(A), let us write at≤(t) to denote the set of atoms
of C(A) below t. Then, in particular,
1. at≤(α1 | ⊤) = {ω1, ω2},
2. at≤(α1 ∨ α2 | ⊤) = at≤(α1 | ⊤) ⊔ at≤(α2 | ⊤) = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4},
3. at≤(α1 | α1 ∨ α2) = {ω1, ω2, ω5}.
Notice that at≤(α1 | ⊤) ∩ at≤(α1 ∨ α2 | ⊤) = at≤(α1 | ⊤) 6= ∅ and in particular
at≤(α1 ∨ α2 | ⊤) \ at≤(α1 | ⊤) = at≤(α2 | ⊤) 6= ∅.
Let p : at(C(A)) → [0, 1] be the probability distribution defined by the following stipula-
tion:
p(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ {ω1, ω2},
1/4 if x ∈ {ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6}.
Thus, let µp : C(A) → [0, 1] be the probability measure on C(A) induced by p: for all
t ∈ C(A), µp(t) =
∑
ω∈at≤(t)
p(ω). In particular we have: µp(α1 | ⊤) = p(ω1) + p(ω2) = 0,
while µp(α1 ∨ α2 | ⊤) = p(ω1) + p(ω2) + p(ω3) + p(ω4) = 1/2 and µp(α1 | α1 ∨ α2) =
p(ω1) + p(ω2) + p(ω5) = 1/4. Hence
0 = µp(α1 | ⊤) 6= µp(α1 | α1 ∨ α2) · µp(α1 ∨ α2 | ⊤) = 1/8
and thus µp does not satisfy (CP4) and is not a conditional probability.
One might wonder if the failure of (CP4) is a consequence of the fact that the distri-
bution p assigns 0 to some atoms, and hence the measure µp is not positive. This is not
the case. Indeed, consider the following distribution parametrized by ǫ:
pǫ(x) =
{
ǫ if x ∈ {ω1, ω2},
1/4 − ǫ/2 if x ∈ {ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6}.
The equation µpǫ(α1 | ⊤) = µpǫ(α1 | α1∨α2) ·µpǫ(α1∨α2 | ⊤) has solution only for ǫ = 1/2
and ǫ = 1/6. In particular, for every 1/6 < ǫ < 1/2, the probability µpǫ is positive but
does not satisfy (CP4).
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The above example can be easily generalised to algebras C(A) withA having more than
3 atoms. In other words, discarding trivial cases, only a proper subclass of probabilities
on a conditional algebra C(A) gives rise to conditional probabilities on A, and obviously,
these are those satisfying the condition
µ((a | b) ⊓ (b | c)) = µ(a | b) · µ(b | c), for all a, b, c ∈ A′ s.t. a ≤ b ≤ c,
which is equivalent to the chain rule in condition (CP4) above as in C(A), (a | c) = (a |
b) ⊓ (b | c) under the hypothesis that a ≤ b ≤ c. Note that it amounts in turn to require
that, in C(A), any pair of conditional events (a | b) and (b | c), with a ≤ b ≤ c, to
be stochastically independent with respect to µ. This motivates our terminology in the
following definition.
Definition 6.4 (Separable probabilities). A probability µ : C(A) → [0, 1] is said to be
separable if µ satisfies the chain rule (CP4).
The following are two significant examples of separable probabilities on C(A).
Example 6.5.
(i) First notice that a map P from a finite Boolean algebra A to the Boolean algebra of
classical truth-values 2 = {0, 1} is a probability iff it is a homomorphism and hence
a truth-valuation. Now, every probability P of C(A) into 2 is separable according
to the previous definition. Indeed, P : C(A) → {0, 1} satisfies (CP4) since, due to
condition (C5) in Proposition 3.3, if a ≤ b ≤ c then
P (a | c) = P ((a | b) ⊓ (b | c)) = min(P (a | b), P (b | c)) = P (a | b) · P (b | c).
Therefore, every {0, 1}-valued probability on C(A) is a conditional probability on A.
(ii) For every finite Boolean algebra A, the probability measure µu : C(A) → [0, 1]
induced by the uniform distribution on the atoms of C(A), i.e. the one defined by
µu(ω) = 1/|at(C(A))| for every ω ∈ at(C(A)), is separable. Indeed, by Corollary
4.8, one has µu(a | b) = |at≤(a)|/|at≤(b)| if a ≤ b.
We finish this section with an observation about convexity. It is well-known that every
probability on a finite Boolean algebra B is a convex combination of homomorphisms of
B into 2 = {0, 1}. So in particular this is the case for C(A). As shown in the example
above, all these homomorphisms are separable. Therefore, since not every probability on
C(A) with |at(A)| ≥ 3 is separable the following corollary immediately follows.
Corollary 6.6. Let A be a Boolean algebra such that |at(A)| ≥ 3. Then, the set of
separable probabilities on C(A) is not convex.
6.2 Conditional probabilities on A as simple probabilities on C(A)
In this subsection we finally address the fundamental question that has motivated our
investigation, namely:
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“Given a (positive) probability on an algebra of events A, P : A→ [0, 1], determine
whether it can always be extended to a probability on the algebra of conditionals
events C(A), µP : C(A)→ [0, 1], agreeing on all basic conditionals, that is,
µP (a | b) =
P (a ∧ b)
P (b)
(3)
for any basic conditional (a | b) ∈ C(A).”
This is, in a slightly different setting, what Goodman and Nguyen call in [26] the
strong conditional event problem. They solve it positively by defining conditional events
as countable unions of special cylinders in the infinite algebra A∞ whose set of atoms is
at(A∞) = {(α1, α2, . . .) : αi ∈ at(A), i = 1, 2, . . .} = (at(A))
N
i.e. infinite sequences of atoms of A, and by defining a probability Pˆ on A∞ as the product
probability measure with identical marginals P on each factor space.
In this section we show we can also solve the problem in a finitary setting by defining
a suitable probability µP : C(A)→ [0, 1] on the finite Boolean algebra C(A).
To this end, given a positive probability on A, we start defining the following map on
at(C(A)).
Definition 6.7. Let P : A→ [0, 1] be a positive probability. Then we define the map µP :
at(C(A))→ [0, 1] by the following stipulation: for every α = 〈α1, . . . , αn−1〉 ∈ Seq(A),
µP (ωα) = P (α1) · P (α2 | ¬α1) · . . . · P (αn−1 | ¬α1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αn−2)
or, equivalently,
µP (ωα) = P (α1) · P (α2 | α2 ∨ . . . ∨ αn−1 ∨ αn) · . . . · P (αn−1 | αn−1 ∨ αn).
Now, we show that the map µP is indeed a probability distribution.
Lemma 6.8. The map µP is a probability distribution on at(C(A)), that is,
∑
α∈Seq(A)
µP (ωα) = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Having a distribution µP on the atoms of C(A), we can define the corresponding
probability measure (that we shall keep denoting by µP ) on C(A) in the obvious way.
Definition 6.9. Given a positive probability P on A, the probability measure on C(A)
induced by the distribution µP on at(C(A)), i.e. for t ∈ C(A),
µP (t) =
∑
ω∈at(C(A)),ω≤t
µP (ω) (4)
will be called the canonical extension of P to C(A).
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The next three lemmas provide a necessary technical preparation for the main result
of this section, namely Theorem 6.13. For them, we invite the reader to recall the main
definitions and constructions of Subsection 4.2 and, in particular, Definitions 5.2 and
5.4. With an abuse of notation, for every subset X of at(C(A)) we write µP (X) for
µP (
∨
ω∈X ω) =
∑
ω∈X µP (ω).
Lemma 6.10. Let αi1 , . . . , αit ∈ at(A). Then
(i) µP (Jαi1 , . . . , αitK) = P (αi1) · P (αi2 )P (¬αi1 ) · . . . ·
P (αit )
P (¬αi1∧¬αi2∧...∧¬αit−1 )
.
(ii) µP (Jαi1 , . . . , αitK) = µP (Jαi1 , . . . , αij−1 , αij+1 , . . . , αitK) · P (αij )P (¬αi1∧¬αi2∧...∧¬αit−1 ) .
Proof. See Appendix.
In the next two lemmas, we will present results which allow us to compute the measure
µP of a basic conditional (α | b), for α ∈ at(A). In particular, adopting the same con-
ventions used in Subsection 5.2 we will henceforth fix, without loss of generality, α = α1.
Also, we invite the reader to remind the definition of Jα1, . . . , αiK as the set of atoms of
C(A) whose initial segment is 〈α1, . . . , αi〉 (Definition 5.2) and the definition of the tree B
(Definition 5.4) together with the definition of subtree of B generated by a Jα1, . . . , αiK.
Lemma 6.11. Let (α1 | b) be a basic conditional such that ¬b = β1∨ . . .∨βk and βk = αn.
Then the following holds: for all t ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},
µP (BJαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) = µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt−1, α1K) · P (βt)
P (b)
,
where BJαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K is understood as the set of all the atoms belonging to its nodes.
Proof. See Appendix.
For the next one, recall the definition of the sets Sj as we did in Subsection 5.2 and,
in particular, Lemma 5.1.
Lemma 6.12. Let (α1 | b) be a basic conditional and let b ≥ α1. Then,
(i) µP (S1) = P (α1);
(ii) for any 2 ≤ j ≤ n, µP (Sj) =
P (α1) · P (αj)
P (b)
.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can now prove the following.
Theorem 6.13. For every positive probability measure P on A, the canonical extension
µP on C(A) is such that, for every basic conditional (a | b),
µP (a | b) =
P (a ∧ b)
P (b)
.
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Proof. Let P be given as in the hypothesis, and let µP be defined on C(A) as in (4). By
definition and Lemma 6.8, µP is a positive probability function. Thus, it is left to prove
that, for every conditional (a | b), µP (a | b) = P (a ∧ b)/P (b).
To this end, recall that for each basic conditional we have (a | b) = (
∨
αi≤a
αi | b) =⊔
αi≤a
(αi | b). Thus, since µP is additive, it is sufficient to prove the claim for those
conditionals of the form (α | b) where α ∈ at(A). Without loss of generality we will
assume α = α1.
Notice first that, if α1 6≤ b, then (α1 | b) = ⊥C, whence the claim is trivial. Thus, we
shall henceforth assume that α1 ≤ b. Now, from Lemma 5.1, {Sj}j=1,...,n is a partition of
at≤(α1 | b). Thus,
µP (α1 | b) =
n∑
j=1
µP (Sj) = µP (S1) +
n∑
j=2
µP (Sj). (5)
From Lemma 5.1 (ii), µP (Sj) = 0 for all j such that αj ≤ b, therefore,
n∑
j=2
µP (Sj) =
∑
j:αj≤¬b
µP (Sj).
By Lemma 6.12 (ii) above, we also have:
∑
j:αj≤¬b
µP (Sj) =
∑
j:αj≤¬b
P (α1) · P (αj)
P (b)
=
P (α1)
P (b)
·
∑
j:αj≤¬b
P (αj) =
P (α1)
P (b)
· P (¬b).
Finally, using this and Lemma 6.12 (i), from (5) we get:
µP (α1 | b) = P (α1) +
P (α1)
P (b) · (1− P (b))
= P (α1) +
P (α1)
P (b) − P (α1)
= P (α1 | b).
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is that, for every positive probability
P on A and for every α = 〈α1, . . . , αn−1〉 ∈ Seq(A), one has
µP (ωα) = µP ((α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (αn−1 | ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αn−2))
= P (α1 | ⊤) · P (α2 | ¬α1) · . . . · P (αn−1 | ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αn−2)
= µP (α1 | ⊤) · µP (α2 | ¬α1) · . . . · µP (αn−1 | ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬αn−2).
(6)
That is, the basic conditionals which conjunctively define an atom of C(A) are jointly
independent with respect to the probability µP .
Furthermore, the following result provides a characterization for the positive and sep-
arable probabilities on C(A).
Corollary 6.14. For every finite Boolean algebra A and for every positive probability µ
on C(A), the following are equivalent:
(i) µ is separable;
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(ii) there is a positive probability Pµ on A such that for every basic conditional (a | b),
µ(a | b) =
Pµ(a ∧ b)
Pµ(b)
= µPµ(a | b).
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii). Let Pµ be the restriction of µ to the Boolean subalgebra A | ⊤ of C(A).
Thus, as A | ⊤ is isomorphic to A by Corollary 3.7, Pµ is a positive probability of A
(Remark 6.2 plus the trivial observation that the positivity of µ induces the positivity of
Pµ). Furthermore, for every basic conditional (a | b) of C(A), from Theorem 6.13 and the
definition of Pµ,
µPµ(a | b) =
Pµ(a ∧ b)
Pµ(b)
=
µ(a ∧ b | ⊤)
µ(b | ⊤)
.
In order to conclude the proof notice that, since µ is separable, µ(a | b) ·µ(b | ⊤) = µ(a∧b |
b) · µ(b | ⊤) = µ(a ∧ b | ⊤). Therefore, µPµ(a | b) =
µ(a ∧ b | ⊤)
µ(b | ⊤)
= µ(a | b).
(2)⇒ (1). For each basic conditional (a | b) ∈ C(A), µ(a | b) = µP (a | b), and since µP is
separable, for all a ≤ b ≤ c ∈ A, one has µ(a | c) = µP (a | c) = µP (a | b) · µP (b | c) = µ(a |
b) · µ(b | c) which settles the claim.
Corollary 6.14 implies that, if µ is separable, the values on basic conditionals (a | b)
only depend on the values on basic conditionals of the form (α | ⊤), with α an atom of
A. Indeed, if µ is separable, then
µ(a | b) =
µ(a ∧ b | ⊤)
µ(b | ⊤)
.
Therefore, any other measure µ′ that coincides with µ on the basic conditionals of the
form (α | ⊤), will coincide as well on each basic conditional.
However, although positive separable measures on C(A) are characterized through
Corollary 6.14 above as those measures which coincide with µP on basic conditionals, the
measures of the form µP are not the unique positive and separable probability functions
on C(A). Indeed, let µP be the canonical extension to C(A) of a positive probability
P : A → [0, 1]. Let at(A) = α1, . . . , αn (with n ≥ 3) and fix two atoms ω1, ω2 ∈
at≤(α1 | ⊤). Assume, without loss of generality, that µP (ω1) ≤ µP (ω2) and take any
0 < ε < min(µP (ω1),1−µP (ω2))2 so that µP (ω1) − ε > 0 and µP (ω2) + ε < 1. Now, for every
ω ∈ at(C(A)), define
µ′(ω) =


µP (ω) if ω 6= ω1, ω 6= ω2,
µP (ω1)− ε if ω = ω1,
µP (ω2) + ε if ω = ω2.
Clearly,
∑
ω∈at(C(A)) µ
′(ω) = 1 and µ′(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ at(C(A)). Thus, µ′ extends to a
positive probability, that we still denote by µ′, on the whole C(A). Further, by definition,
µ′(α1 | ⊤) = µP (α1 | ⊤), whence for all αi ∈ at(A), µ
′(αi | ⊤) = µP (αi | ⊤) and therefore,
by the above considerations,
µ′(a | b) = µP (a | b) for every basic conditional (a | b) ∈ C(A). (7)
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Moreover, the above property and the separability of µP imply the separability of µ
′.
Indeed, for every a ≤ b ≤ c ∈ A′,
µ′((a | b) ⊓ (b | c)) = µ′(a | c) = µP (a | c) = µP (a | b) · µP (b | c) = µ
′(a | b) · µ′(b | c).
However, µ′ is not expressible as the canonical extension µP ′ for some positive P
′ on A.
For otherwise, assuming that ω1 = (α1 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α1) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (αn−1 |
∧n−1
i=1 ¬αi), from
(6) and (7), one would have
µ′(ω1) = µ
′(α1 | ⊤)·. . . ·µ
′(αn−1 |
n−1∧
i=1
¬αi) = µP (α1 | ⊤)·. . . ·µP (αn−1 |
n−1∧
i=1
¬αi) = µP (ω1)
while µ′(ω1) = µP (ω1)− ε and ε > 0.
Summing up, besides the whole class of (simple) probabilities on a Boolean algebra of
conditionals C(A), we can identify three relevant subclasses:
1. Σ = {µ : C(A)→ [0, 1] | µ is a positive probability function}
2. Γ = {µ : C(A)→ [0, 1] | µ is positive and separable}
3. Π = {µ : C(A)→ [0, 1] | µ = µP for some positive probability P on A}
Obviously Π ⊆ Γ ⊆ Σ. Furthermore, for |at(A)| ≥ 3 all inclusions are proper as witnessed
by the above and Example 6.3.
7 A logical reading of Boolean conditionals
In this section we undertake a natural step towards defining a logic to reason with con-
ditionals whose semantics is in accordance with the notion of the Boolean algebra of
conditionals as described above. This logic, that we call the Logic of Boolean Condition-
als (LBC) is axiomatized in the following subsection, while its semantics is introduced
in Subsection 7.2 where we also prove a completeness theorem. In Subsection 7.3, we
investigate the relation between LBC and non-monotonic reasoning.
7.1 Syntax and axiomatics
Let us start by considering the classical propositional logic language L, built from a fi-
nite set of propositional variables p1, p2, . . . pm. Let ⊢CPL denote derivability in Classical
Propositional Logic. Based on L, we define the language CL of conditionals by the following
stipulations:
- Basic (or atomic) conditional formulas, expressions of the form (ϕ | ψ) where ϕ,ψ ∈ L
and such that 6⊢CPL ¬ψ, are in CL.
- Further, if Φ,Ψ ∈ CL, then ¬Φ,Φ ∧ Ψ ∈ CL.4 Other connectives like ∨, → and ↔
are defined as usual.
4We use the same symbols for connectives in L and in CL without danger of confusion.
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Note that we do not allow the nesting of conditionals, as usually done in the vast literature
on the modal approaches to Conditional Logics (see, for a general survey, [3].)
Actually, we could also allow purely propositional formulas from L to be part of CL
but, as a matter of fact, any proposition ϕ will be always identifiable with the conditional
(ϕ | ⊤). Next an axiomatic system for a logic of Boolean conditionals over the language
CL is presented.
Definition 7.1. The Logic of Boolean conditionals (LBC for short) has the following
axioms5 and rules:
(CPL) For any tautology of CPL, the formula resulting from a uniform replacement of the
variables by basic conditionals.
(A1) (ψ | ψ)
(A2) ¬(ϕ | ψ)↔ (¬ϕ | ψ)
(A3) (ϕ | ψ) ∧ (δ | ψ)↔ (ϕ ∧ δ | ψ)
(A4) (ϕ | ψ)↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ | ψ)
(A5) (ϕ | ψ)↔ (ϕ | χ) ∧ (χ | ψ), if ⊢CPL ϕ→ χ and ⊢CPL χ→ ψ
(R1) from ⊢CPL ϕ→ ψ derive (ϕ | χ)→ (ψ | χ)
(R2) from ⊢CPL χ↔ ψ derive (ϕ | χ)↔ (ϕ | ψ)
(MP) Modus Ponens: from Φ and Φ→ Ψ derive Ψ
The notion of proof in LBC, ⊢LBC , is defined as usual from the above axioms and rules.
As we pointed out at the beginning of this section, in the language CL, basic condi-
tional formulas (ϕ | ψ) can be regarded, in logical terms, as new (complex) propositional
variables where the compound conditional formulas are built upon using the classical CPL
connectives ∧ and ¬. Therefore, deductions in LBC employ axioms (A1)-(A5) and rules
(R1), (R2) to reason about the internal structure of basic conditional formulas, and the
axioms and rules of CPL (captured by the axiom schema (CPL) and the Modus Ponens
rule) for compound conditional formulas. This means that, if we denote by AX the set of
all instantiations of the axioms (A1)-(A5) once closed by rules (R1) and (R2), deductions
in LBC can in fact be translated to deductions from AX (taken as a theory) only using the
rules and axioms of CPL. This is formally expressed in the first item of following lemma.
As a consequence of this translation, among other facts, it follows that the logic LBC
satisfies the deduction theorem, also stated in the same lemma.
Lemma 7.2. For any set of CL-formulas Γ∪ {Φ,Ψ}, the following properties hold, where
AX is as above:
• Γ ⊢LBC Φ iff Γ ∪ AX ⊢CPL Φ.
5Actually, Axiom (A4) is not independent since it follows from (A1) and (A3), but we leave it for the
sake of coherence with the algebraic part. In the same vein, we could replace the equivalence connective
↔ by the implication connective→ in Axioms (A2) and (A3), since the other direction can be deduced by
classical reasoning and using axiom (A4) and the rule (R1) respectively.
30
• Deduction theorem: Γ ∪ {Ψ} ⊢LBC Φ iff Γ ⊢LBC Ψ→ Φ.
The above axiomatic system is clearly inspired by the key properties of Boolean al-
gebras of conditionals we discussed in Section 3. Indeed, as expected, we can prove that
the Lindenbaum algebra of provably equivalent formulas of LBC can be seen, in fact,
as a Boolean algebra of conditionals. In slightly more detail, for any Φ,Ψ ∈ CL, let us
write Φ ≡ Ψ if ⊢LBC Φ ↔ Ψ. Notice that rules (R1) and (R2) ensure that ≡ preserves
propositional logical equivalence in the sense that if ⊢CPL ϕ ↔ ϕ
′ and ⊢CPL ψ ↔ ψ
′,
then (ϕ | ψ) ≡ (ϕ′ | ψ′). Moreover, ≡ is compatible, in the sense of Section 2, with
Boolean operations. Thus, the quotient set CL/≡ endowed with the following operations
is a Boolean algebra:
⊤≡ = [(⊤ | ⊤)]≡ and ⊥≡ = [(⊥ | ⊤)]≡;
[Φ]≡ ⊓ [Ψ]≡ = [Φ ∧Ψ]≡;
[Φ]≡ ⊔ [Ψ]≡ = [Φ ∨Ψ]≡;
∼[Φ]≡ = [¬Φ]≡.
We claim that CL = (CL/≡,⊓,⊔,∼,⊤≡,⊥≡) is isomorphic to C(L), the Boolean algebra
of conditionals of the Lindenbaum algebra L of CPL over the language L. Note that, by
definition, ⊢LBC Φ iff [Φ]≡ = ⊤≡.
Theorem 7.3. CL ∼= C(L).
The proof is not difficult but the details are a bit tedious and can be found in the
Appendix. However, it is convenient to point out that the isomorphism ι between CL and
C(L) acts on basic conditionals in the expected way: for each pair of formulas ϕ,ψ such
that 6⊢CPL ¬ψ, the element [(ϕ | ψ)]≡ of CL is mapped by ι to ([ϕ] | [ψ]) ∈ C(L). As for
operations it is enough to ask that ι commutes with ⊓ and ∼. Then, if for instance we
have two basic conditionals of CL of the form [(ϕ | ψ)]≡ and [(δ | ψ)]≡, by definition of ≡,
ι([(ϕ | ψ)]≡ ⊓ [(δ | ψ)]≡) = ι([(ϕ∧ δ | ψ)]≡) = ([ϕ∧ψ] | [δ]) and, in turn by the property of
the conditional algebra C(L), ([ϕ∧ δ] | [ψ]) = ([ϕ] | [ψ])∧ ([δ] | [ψ]) = ι([(ϕ | ψ)]≡)∧ ι([(δ |
ψ)]≡).
7.2 Semantics and completeness
The intuitive idea in defining a semantics for the logic LBC is that, as in classical logic
(recall Proposition 2.2 (iv)) the evaluations of CL-formulas should be in 1-1 correspon-
dence with the atoms of the algebra C(L), which is, by Theorem 7.3, isomorphic to the
Lindenbaum algebra CL of LBC. As we have seen in Section 4, atoms of C(L) can be
described by sequences of atoms of L.
In the following let Ω be the set of (classical) evaluations v : L → {0, 1} for the
propositional language L. Recall from Section 2 that if L is built from m propositional
variables, then |Ω| = 2m. Moreover, we can identify every evaluation v ∈ Ω with its
corresponding minterm and hence with an atom of Lindenbaum algebra L. Therefore, it
follows from Section 4 that the atoms of C(L) are of the form
(v1 | ⊤) ⊓ (v2 | ¬v1) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (v2m−1 | ¬v1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬v2m−2),
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where 〈v1, . . . , v2m−1〉 ∈ Seq(L). The idea is then to define CL-interpretations as sequences
e = 〈v1, . . . , v2m〉 of pair-wise distinct 2
m
L-interpretations of Ω and to stipulate that such
a CL-interpretation e makes true a conditional (ϕ | ψ) when the atom in C(L) determined
by e
ωe = (v1 | ⊤) ⊓ (v2 | ¬v1) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (v2m−1 | ¬v1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬v2m−2), (8)
is below (ϕ | ψ), the latter thought of as an element of C(L) as well. This condition has an
easier expression according to (iii) of Proposition 4.7, that leads to the following natural
definition. In the following we will assume |Ω| = m and we fix n = 2m to simplify the
reading.
Definition 7.4. A CL-interpretation is a sequence e = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉 of n pairwise dis-
tinct v1, . . . , vn ∈ Ω. We denote also by e the corresponding evaluation of CL-formulas,
i.e. the mapping e : CL→ {0, 1} defined as follows:
- for basic CL-formulas: e(ϕ | ψ) = 1 if vi |= ϕ for the lowest index i such that vi |= ψ,
and e(ϕ | ψ) = 0 otherwise.
- for compound CL-formulas: e is extended using Boolean truth-functions.
The corresponding notion of consequence is as expected: for any set of CL-formulas Γ∪{Φ},
Γ |=LBC Φ if for every CL-interpretation e such that e(Ψ) = 1 for all Ψ ∈ Γ, it also holds
e(Φ) = 1.
By Proposition 2.2, given any homomorphism h : C(L) → {0, 1}, let ωh be its cor-
responding atom, i.e., λ(ωh) = h in the terminology of Proposition 2.2 (iii). We further
denote by Λ(h) the sequence 〈v1, . . . , vn−1, vn〉 such that 〈v1, . . . , vn−1〉 univocally deter-
mines ωh via (8) and vn is the only evaluation left in Ω \ {v1, . . . , vn−1}.
Lemma 7.5. For every homomorphism h : C(L) → {0, 1}, Λ(h) is a CL-interpretation.
Further, for each CL-formula Φ, h(Φ) = 1 iff Λ(h)(Φ) = 1.
Proof. If h : C(L)→ {0, 1} is a homomorphism, Λ(h) is a CL-interpretation by definition.
Now we prove, by structural induction on the complexity of Φ, that Λ(h)(Φ) = 1 iff h(Φ) =
1. The interesting case is when Φ is a basic conditional (ϕ | ψ) such that (ϕ | ψ) 6≡ ⊤. In
that case, h(Φ) = 1 iff ωh ≤ (ϕ | ψ) iff (by Proposition 4.7) there exists an index i ≤ n− 1
such that vi(ϕ) = vi(ψ) = 1 and vj(ψ) = 0 for all j < i, and thus, iff Λ(h)(Φ) = 1.
Now the soundness and completeness of LBC easily follow from the above.
Theorem 7.6 (Soundness and completeness). LBC is sound and complete w.r.t. CL-
evaluations, i.e. ⊢LBC = |=LBC .
Proof. Soundness is easy. As for completeness, assume that Γ 6⊢LBC Φ. Thus, in particular
Φ is false in C(L), meaning that there exists a homomorphism h : C(L)→ {0, 1} such that
h(γ) = 1 for all γ ∈ Γ, and h(Φ) = 0. Thus, by Lemma 7.5, Λ(h) is a CL-interpretation
such that Λ(h)(γ) = 1 for every γ ∈ Γ and Λ(h)(Φ) = 0, i.e. Γ 6|=LBC Φ .
Remark 7.7. One could also define an alternative semantics for LBC in terms of a
class of Kripke models with order relations, more in the style of conditional logics (see
[30]). This Kripke-style semantics can also be shown to be adequate for LBC (and hence
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equivalent to the previous more algebraic semantics), although it is not fully exploited as
the language of LBC does not contain nested applications of the conditioning operator
nor pure propositional formulas. Indeed, one can define LBC-Kripke models as structures
M = (W, {≻w}w∈W , e), where (i) W is a non-empty set of worlds, (ii) for each world
w ∈ W , ≻w is a (dual) well-order
6 such that w ≻w w
′ for every w 6= w′ ∈W , and (iii) e :
W ×V → {0, 1} is a valuation function for propositional variables, that naturally extends
to any Boolean combination of variables. For every w ∈ W and B ⊆ W , let bestw(B)
denote the greatest element in B according to ≻w. Moreover, for any propositional (non-
conditional) ϕ, we will use JϕK to denote the set of worlds in M evaluating ϕ to true, i.e.
JϕK = {w ∈W | e(w,ϕ) = 1}.
Truth in a pointed model is defined by induction as follows. For each w ∈W we define:
• (M,w) |=K (ϕ | ψ) if either JψK = ∅ or bestw(JψK) ∈ JϕK. Equivalently, in case
JψK 6= ∅, then (M,w) |=K (ϕ | ψ) if (M, bestw(JψK)) |=K ϕ.
• Satisfaction for Boolean combinations of conditionals is defined in the usual way.
It is not difficult to see that LBC is also sound w.r.t. to the class of LBC-Kripke models.
As for completeness, assume as usual that Γ 6⊢LBC Φ, with Γ a finite set, and let us prove
that Γ 6|=K Φ. From Lemma 7.2, the condition Γ 6⊢LBC Φ is equivalent to 6⊢LBC Φ
′, where
Φ′ =
∧
Ψ∈ΓΨ→ Φ. This means that [Φ
′]≡ 6= [⊤]≡ in the (finite) Lindenbaum algebra CL.
By Theorem 7.3, for practical purposes we can identify CL with the Boolean algebra of
conditionals C(L). Therefore, there is an atom ω ∈ C(L) such that ω 6≤ [Φ′]≡. As we have
seen in Section 4, atoms of C(L) can be described by sequences of pair-wise different atoms
ωi of L. But each atom ωi of L can in turn be identified with (the minterm associated
to) a Boolean evaluation vi of the propositional variables V . Therefore if we let Ω be
the set of evaluations of the propositional variables V , we can assume ω = 〈v1, . . . , vn−1〉,
with n = 2|V | and where v1, . . . , vn−1 ∈ Ω. Finally, we consider an LBC-Kripke model
M∗ = (Ω, {≻∗v}v∈Ω, e
∗) where:
• ≻∗v1⊂ Ω×Ω is such that vi ≻
∗
v1
vi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
7 and for all i 6= 1, ≻∗vi is an
arbitrary (dual) well-order on Ω;
• e∗ : Ω× V → {0, 1} is such that e∗(v, p) = v(p) for every p ∈ V .
Then, it is clear that the condition ω 6≤ [Φ′]≡ guarantees that (M
∗, v1) 6|=K Φ
′.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 7.6 and the fact that there are only finitely
many CL-evaluations is the decidability of the calculus LBC. Furthermore, a basic con-
ditional (ϕ | ψ) is satisfiable in LBC iff there exists a classical valuation v such that
v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1. Indeed, if a CL-interpretation e = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉 is such that e(ϕ | ψ) = 1,
there is i such that vi(ϕ∧ψ) = 1. Conversely, if v(ϕ∧ψ) = 1, then any CL-interpretation
e = 〈v, v2, . . . , vn〉, by definition, is a model of the conditional (ϕ | ψ). Thus, the satisfi-
ability of a basic conditional (ϕ | ψ) reduces to the classical satisfiability. However, this
direct reduction does not generally apply to the cases in which the conditional formula is
a (non-trivial) Boolean combination of basic conditionals.
6A dual well-order in W is a total order ≻ such that every subset B ⊆W has a greatest element.
7Where vn = Ω \ {v1, . . . , vn−1}.
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Moreover, since basic conditionals of the form (ϕ | ⊤) are equivalent to ϕ, it is also
easy to see that the classical satisfiability is a subproblem of the satisfiability of LBC which
shows the latter to be NP-hard.
Determining a possible NP-containment for the LBC-satisfiability is out of the scope
of the present paper and it will be addressed in our future work.
7.3 Relation to non-monotonic reasoning models
Conditionals possess an implicit non-monotonic behaviour. Given a conditional (ϕ | ψ),
it does not follow in general that we can freely strengthen its antecedent, i.e. in general,
(ϕ | ψ) 6⊢LBC (ϕ | ψ ∧ χ). For instance, ϕ,ψ, χ can be such that ϕ ∧ ψ 6|= ⊥ while
ϕ∧ψ∧χ |= ⊥. Actually, and not very surprisingly, the logic ⊢LBC satisfies the analogues of
the KLM-properties which characterize the well-known system P of preferential entailment
[38, 42].
Lemma 7.8. ⊢LBC satisfies the following properties:
Reflexivity: ⊢LBC (ϕ | ϕ)
Left logical equivalence: if |=CPL ϕ↔ ψ then (χ | ϕ) ⊢LBC (χ | ψ)
Right weakening: if |=CPL ϕ→ ψ then (ϕ | χ) ⊢LBC (ψ | χ)
Cut: (ϕ | ψ) ∧ (χ | ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊢LBC (χ | ψ)
OR: (ϕ | ψ) ∧ (ϕ | χ) ⊢LBC (ϕ | ψ ∨ χ)
AND: (ϕ | ψ) ∧ (δ | ψ) ⊢LBC (ϕ ∧ δ | ψ)
Cautious Monotony: (ϕ | ψ) ∧ (χ | ψ) ⊢LBC (χ | ϕ ∧ ψ)
Proof. Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening and AND correspond to
(A1), (R2), (R1), and (A3) of LBC, respectively. The other cases are proved as follows.
Cut: by (A4), (χ | ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ϕ | ψ) is equivalent to (χ ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ | ψ), and
by (A5), it is equivalent to (χ ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ | ψ), and by (R1) this clearly implies (χ | ψ).
Cautious Monotony: by (A3), (ϕ | ψ) ∧ (χ | ψ) is equivalent to (ϕ∧ χ | ψ), which by (A4)
is in turn equivalent (ϕ ∧ χ ∧ ψ | ψ), and by (A5) implies (ϕ ∧ χ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∧ ψ), which by
(A3) is equivalent to (χ | ϕ ∧ ψ).
OR: (ϕ | ψ) ∧ (ϕ | χ) is equivalent to [(ϕ | ψ) ∧ (ϕ | χ) ∧ (ψ | ψ ∨ χ)] ∨ [(ϕ | ψ) ∧ (ϕ |
χ) ∧ (χ | ψ ∨ χ)], and this implies [(ϕ ∧ ψ | ψ) ∧ (ψ | ψ ∨ χ)] ∨ [(ϕ ∧ χ | χ) ∧ (χ | ψ ∨ χ)],
that is equivalent to (ϕ∧ψ | ψ ∨χ)∨ (ϕ∧χ | ψ ∨χ), which finally implies (ϕ | ψ ∨χ).
Now, let us fix a set of (atomic) conditional statements K, and let us define the
consequence relation associated to K: ϕ |∼K ψ if K ⊢LBC (ψ | ϕ). Our last claim is easily
derived from the previous lemma.
Theorem 7.9. |∼K is a preferential consequence relation.
However, the following also well-known rule
Rational Monotonicity: if ψ |∼ ϕ and ψ |6∼ ¬χ then ψ ∧ χ |∼ ϕ
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does not hold in general for |∼= |∼K as the following example shows, and thus |∼K is not
a rational consequence relation in the sense of Lehmann and Magidor [38].
Example 7.10. Fix a propositional language L with 2 propositional variables, say p, q,
so that it has four minterms (α1 = p ∧ q, α2 = p ∧ ¬q, α3 = ¬p ∧ q, α4 = ¬p ∧ ¬q), that
correspond to the 4 atoms of its Lindenbaum algebra L. The Lindenbaum algebra CL of
the language of conditionals CL is isomorphic to the algebra C(L) with 24 atoms and 224
elements.
Consider the following propositions: ϕ = α1∨α4, ψ = ⊤, χ = α1∨α3 and the following
set of only one conditional statement K = {(ϕ | ψ)} = {(α1 ∨ α4 | ⊤)}. Note that (¬χ |
ψ) = (¬(α1∨α3) | ⊤) ≡ (α2∨α4 | ⊤) and (ϕ | χ∧ψ) = (α1∨α4 | α1∨α3) ≡ (α1 | α1∨α3).
Then we have:
(1) K ⊢ (ϕ | ψ)
(2) K 6⊢LBC (¬χ | ψ), i.e. (α1 ∨ α4 | ⊤) 6⊢LBC (α2 ∨ α4 | ⊤), but
(3) K 6⊢LBC (ϕ | χ ∧ ψ), i.e. (α1 ∨ α4 | ⊤) 6⊢LBC (α1 | α1 ∨ α3)
(1) and (2) are clear. Hence, let us prove (3). Via Theorem 7.6, it is enough to show
that there is an atom from C(L) below (α1 ∨ α4 | ⊤) but not below (α1 | α1 ∨ α3) (recall
to this end Proposition 4.7). Consider the atom from C(L) ωβ, with β = 〈α4, α2, α3〉, that
is, ωβ = (α4 | ⊤) ⊓ (α2 | ¬α4) ⊓ (α3 | ¬α4 ∧ ¬α2). Then:
- Clearly ωβ ≤ (α1 ∨ α4 | ⊤).
- However, ωβ 6≤ (α1 | α1 ∨ α3). Indeed, the least index i for which βi ≤ α1 ∨ α3 is
i = 3: β3 = α3 ≤ α1 ∨ α3, but α3 6≤ α1. Then C(L) 6|= (α1 ∨ α4 | ⊤)→ (α1 | α1 ∨ α3) and
hence, by Theorem 7.3 and Lemma 7.2, (α1 ∨ α4 | ⊤) 6⊢LBC (α1 | α1 ∨ α3).
Let us notice that Rational Monotonicity does hold whenever we further require the
relation |∼K to be defined by a complete theory K. Indeed, if K is complete, for each ϕ
and ψ, one has ϕ |∼K ψ iff ϕ |6∼K ¬ψ. Then, if we replace ϕ |6∼K ¬ψ by ϕ |∼K ψ in the
previous expression of the Rational Monotony property, what we get is:
If ψ |∼K ϕ and ψ |∼K χ then ψ ∧ χ |∼K ϕ,
that is, we are back to the Cautious Monotony property (see [38, §3.4]).
We finally notice that axiom (A2) of LBC implies
⊢LBC (ϕ | ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ | ψ).
In general, this does not imply that |∼K satisfies the so-called Conditional Excluded Middle
property [5], namely
either ψ |∼K ϕ or ψ |∼K ¬ϕ.
However if K is complete, then ψ |∼K ¬ϕ is logically equivalent to ψ 6 |∼K ϕ, yielding the
property of Conditional Excluded Middle.
8 Related work on conditional algebras
In this section we discuss related algebraic approaches to conditional events, which we
group in (three-valued) Measure-free conditionals and Conditional Event Algebras. The
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former lead necessarily to non-Boolean structures whereas the latter to Boolean structures.
Our approach combines elements of both. Boolean Algebras of Conditionals have a similar
language as Measure-free conditionals and share the underlying Boolean structure with
Conditional Event Algebras.
8.1 Measure-free conditionals
One of the most relevant approaches to study conditionals independently from conditional
probability and outside modal logic has been to consider measure-free conditionals as
three-valued objects: given two propositions a, b of a classical propositional language L,
a conditional (a | b) is true when a and b are true, is false when a is false and b is true,
and inapplicable when b is false. This three-valued approach actually goes back to de
Finetti in the Thirties [13] and Schay in the Sixties [47], and was later further developed
among others by Calabrese [8], Goodman, Nguyen and Walker [26, 27, 28, 52], Gilio and
Sanfilippo [24], and Dubois and Prade [16, 17]. In particular the last authors have also
formally related measure-free conditionals and non-monotonic reasoning. The rest of this
section is mainly from [17].
The idea is to extend any Boolean interpretation v : L→ {0, 1} for the language L to
a three-valued interpretation v : (L | L)→ {0, 1, ?} on the set of conditionals (L | L) built
from L and defined as follows:
v(a | b) =
{
v(a), if v(b) = 1
?, otherwise.
Although the third truth-value “?” denotes inapplicable, it is usually be understood as
“any truth-value”, i.e. one can take ? as the set {0, 1}. Indeed, this interpretation is
compatible with taking v(a | b) as the set of solutions x ∈ {0, 1} of the equation
v(a ∧ b) = x ∧∗ v(b),
where ∧∗ is the Boolean truth-function for conjunction, once values for v(a) and v(b) have
been fixed, and hence v(a∧b) as well. In particular, when b = ⊤, there is a unique solution
v(a | ⊤) = {v(a)}, for every v and a.
From an algebraic point of view, considering plain events belonging to a Boolean al-
gebra A (f.i. the Lindenbaum algebra for the above propositional language L), the above
three-valued semantics led Goodman and Nguyen’s to the following definition of a condi-
tional event [27], not as another event, but as a set of events in A:
(a | b) = {x ∈ A | x ∧ b = a ∧ b},
that turns out to actually be an interval in the algebra A, indeed, it can be checked that
(a | b) = {x ∈ A | a ∧ b ≤ x ≤ b→ a} = [a ∧ b, b→ a].
It is worth noticing that conditionals of the form (a | ⊤), where ⊤ is the top element of A,
can be safely identified with the plain event a ∈ A, since [a∧⊤,⊤ → a] = {a}. Moreover,
this definition leads, in turn, to usually accepted equalities among conditionals like
(a | b) = (a ∧ b | b) = (a↔ b | b) = (b→ a | b),
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since all of them define the same interval. By Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.4, the above
equalities hold in every Boolean algebras of conditionals. However, observe that, contrarily
to Boolean conditionals, if a < ⊤, then (a | a) 6= (⊤ | ⊤).
From the above definition, it directly follows that the condition for the equality between
two conditionals is the same as we determined in Theorem 4.12 (except for the case where
both are ⊤C or ⊥C):
(a | b) = (c | d) iff a ∧ b = c ∧ d and b = d,
while the commonly adopted and compatible notion of ordering is the one defined by the
interval order:
(a | b) ≤ (c | d) iff a ∧ b ≤ c ∧ d and b→ a ≤ d→ c, (9)
that is of course a partial order, with T = (⊤ | ⊤) and F = (⊥ | ⊤) being the top
and bottom conditionals respectively. It is interesting to notice that, if ⊥ < a < b and
⊥ < c < d, the left-to-right direction of (9) holds in every C(A). Indeed, under those
further conditions, (a | b) ≤ (c | d) gives, by Lemma 4.14 (ii), that a = a ∧ b ≤ c = c ∧ d.
Moreover, a > ⊥ implies ⊥ < b → a, and b → a ≤ a < b. Similarly, ⊥ < d → c < d.
Therefore, since (a | b) = (b → a | b) and (c | d) = (d → c | d), one has b→ a ≤ d→ c as
well.
It is clear that, in the above setting of three-valued conditionals, any conditional can
always be equated to another one of the form (a | b) where a ≤ b. Thus the set of
conditionals built from events from a Boolean algebra A can be identified with the set
A | A = {(a | b) : a, b ∈ A, a ≤ b}, that is in 1-1 correspondence with the set Int(A) of
intervals in A. Therefore, in this setting, conditioning can be viewed in fact as an external
operation A×A→ Int(A).
Several attempts have been made to define reasonable operations on measure-free con-
ditionals as internal operations on Int(A), in particular operations of “conjunction” ∧,
“disjunction” ∨ and “negation” ¬. There is a widespread consensus on the definition of
the negation ¬ by stipulating ¬(a | b) = (¬a | b), which coincides with the one on Boolean
conditionals. As to conjunction, there have been some reasonable proposals in the liter-
ature, corresponding to different possibilities of defining the truth-table of a three-valued
conjunction on {0, 1, ?} (see [15, 17]), but two of them emerge as the major competing
proposals, as they are the only ones satisfying the following qualitative counterpart of
Bayes rule: (a | b) AND (b | ⊤) = (a ∧ b | ⊤).8
Goodman and Nguyen (cf. [27]): (a | b)∧I (c | d) = (a∧ c | (¬a∧ b)∨ (¬c∧d)∨ (b∧d))
Schay, Calabrese (cf. [47, 8]): (a | b) ∧Q (c | d) = ((b→ a) ∧ (d→ c) | b ∨ d)
The operation ∧I is in fact a genuine interval-based conjunction, in the sense that the
interval interpreting (a | b) ∧I (c | d) is the result of computing all the conjunctions of
the elements of the intervals interpreting the conditionals (a | b) and (c | d), that is, if
(a | b)∧I (c | d) = (u | v) then [u∧v, v → u] = {x∧y | x ∈ [a∧ b, b→ a], y ∈ [c∧d, d→ c]}.
On the other hand, the operation ∧Q, also known as quasi-conjunction [2], is tightly
related to the interval order on conditionals defined above, in the sense that (a | b) ≤ (c | d)
8Note that this a particular case of our Requirement R4 for Boolean algebras of conditionals, see (v)
of Proposition 3.3 and (ii) of Corollary 3.4.
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iff (a | b) ∧Q (c | d) = (a | b). Dubois and Prade [17] consider that only the use of the
quasi-conjunction ∧Q is appropriate in the context of non-monotonic reasoning, where
conditionals (a | b) are viewed as non-monotonic conditional assertions or default rules
“if b then generally a”, usually denoted as b |∼ a. In fact, consider an entailment re-
lation between finite sets of conditionals and conditionals as follows: a finite set of con-
ditionals K = {(ai | bi)}i∈I entails another conditional (c | d), written K |= (c | d), if
either (c | d) ∈ K or there is a non-empty subset S ⊆ K s.t. C(S) ≤ (c | d), where
C(S) = ∧Q{(a | b) | (a | b) ∈ S} is the quasi-conjunction of all the conditionals in S.
Then they show that this notion of entailment basically coincides with the nonmonotonic
consequence relation of System P. More explicitly, they show the following characterisation
result:
K |= (c | d) iff (c | d) can be derived from K using the rules of system P
and the axiom schema (x | x).
On the other hand, corresponding disjunction operations ∨I and ∨Q on conditionals
are defined by De Morgan’s laws from ∧I ,∧Q respectively.
All these conjunctions and disjunctions are commutative, associative and idempotent,
and moreover they coincide over conditionals with a common antedecent. More precisely,
(a ∧ c | b) = (a | b) ∧I (c | b) = (a | b) ∧Q (c | b). However, none of the algebras
(A | A,∧i,∨i,¬,T,F), for i ∈ {I,Q}, is in fact a Boolean algebra. For instance, Schay [47]
and Calabrese [8] show that ∧Q and ∨Q do not distribute with respect to each other.
It is worth noticing that the above conjunctions are defined in order to make the
class A | A of conditional objects closed under ∧i, and hence an algebra. Therefore,
for every a1, b1, a2, b2 ∈ A, and for every i ∈ {I,Q}, there exists c, d ∈ A such that,
(a1 | b1) ∧i (a2 | b2) = (c | d). On the other hand, our construction of conditional algebra
defines a structure whose domain strictly contains all the elements (a | b) for a in A, and
b ∈ A′. This allows us to relax this condition of closure as stated above. Indeed, for every
pair of conditionals of the form (a1 | b1) and (a2 | b2) belonging to the conditional algebra,
their conjunction is always an element of the algebra (i.e. the conjunction is a total, and
not a partial, operation), but in general it will be not in the form (c | d). Moreover our
definition of conjunction behaves as ∧I and ∧Q whenever restricted to those conditionals
with a common antedecent or context.
8.2 Conditional Event Algebras
In his paper [51], van Fraassen devises a minimal logic CE of conditionals whose language
is obtained from classical propositional language by adding a “conditional symbol” ⇒.
The algebraic counterpart of CE are the so-called proposition algebras. A proposition
algebra is a pair 〈F,⇒〉 where F is a Boolean algebra (of events) and⇒ is a partial binary
operation on F such that (where defined) satisfying the following requirements:
(I) (A⇒ B) ∧ (A⇒ C) = A⇒ (B ∧ C)
(II) (A⇒ B) ∨ (A⇒ C) = A⇒ (B ∨ C)
(III) A ∧ (A⇒ B) = A ∧B
(IV) A⇒ A = ⊤
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Propositional algebras lead to probabilistic models by adding a probability measure P
to the algebras and requiring that the following is satisfied
(m2) If P (A) 6= 0 then P (A⇒ B) = P (A ∧B)/P (A).
In the same paper van Fraassen uses the usual product space construction to provide
models of the above. In particular, starting from a Boolean algebra of ordinary events A
and a probability measure P on it, he finds a way of representing conditional events such
that: (1) conditional events (b | a) live in a bigger Boolean algebra A∗; (2) ordinary events
a are a special kind of conditional events, i.e. a should be identified with (a | ⊤); (3) the
rule of modus ponens a ∧ (b | a) ≤ b holds true in A∗; and (4) the probability measure P
on A can be extended to probability measure P ∗ on A∗ satisfying (m2) above.
Goodman and Nguyen [26] build on this to define a Conditional Event Algebras (known
as Goodman-Nguyen-van Fraassen algebra). To compare this to our setting, let us recall
this construction in the case where the initial algebra A is finite. Consider the countable
Cartesian product Ω∞ = at(A) × at(A)× . . ., i.e. the set of countably infinite sequences
of atoms of A. Then A∗ is defined as the σ-algebra of subsets of Ω∞ generated by all the
cylinder sets of the form
〈a1, . . . , an,⊤,⊤, . . .〉 = {(w1, w2, . . . , wn, wn+1, . . .) ∈ Ω
∞ | wi ≤ ai, for i = 1, . . . , n},
for n ∈ N and a1, . . . , an ∈ A. Then, for every pair of events a, b ∈ A, Goodman and
Nguyen define the conditional event (b | a) as the element of A∗ that is the following
countable union of pairwise disjoint cylinder sets:
(b | a) :=
⋃
k≥0
〈¬a, k. . .,¬a, a ∧ b,⊤,⊤ . . .〉 . (10)
Note that the initial algebra of events A is isomorphic to the subalgebra of A∗ of con-
ditionals of the form (a | ⊤) = 〈a,⊤,⊤, . . .〉, with a ∈ A. Now, any probability measure
P on A extends to a suitable probability P ∗ on A∗. Namely, one can define P ∗ on the
cylinder sets of A∗ as
P ∗(〈a1, . . . , an,⊤,⊤, . . .〉) = P (a1) · . . . · P (an),
and using Kolmogorov extension theorem (cf. [50, §2.4]), P ∗ can be extended to the whole
σ-algebra A∗.
Finally, they show that the probability P ∗ on conditionals actually coincides with the
conditional probability: if P (a) > 0, then one has:
P ∗((b | a)) = P ∗

⋃
k≥0
〈¬a, k. . .,¬a, a ∧ b,⊤,⊤ . . .〉


=
∑
k≥0
P ∗(〈¬a, k. . .,¬a, a ∧ b,⊤,⊤ . . .〉)
= P (a ∧ b) ·
∑
k≥0
(1− P (a))k
=
P (a ∧ b)
P (a)
,
(11)
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where the last equality is obtained by using the well-known formula for the sum of a
geometric series, in this case the ratio being 1 − P (a), and getting
∑
k≥0(1 − P (a))
k =
1/P (a).
Summing up, both our approach and the Goodman-Nguyen-van Frassen one aim at
the introduction of a formal structure to study conditional probability as measures of
conditionals. To this end we both require the underlying algebraic structure to be Boolean.
On the other hand, and this marks a first technical difference, whenever the starting
Boolean algebra A is finite, C(A) is finite as well while A∗ is always infinite, and moreover
each conditional in A∗ is defined itself as an infinitary joint, see (10) above. Note that, for
equating P ∗((b | a)) with P (a∧b)/P (a), the derivation (11) necessarily requires P ∗((b | a))
to decompose in infinitely-many summands.
A further important difference concerns the definition of conditional events. In fact,
although in our approach the algebra C(A) itself defines the conditionals and character-
izes their properties at a formal algebraic level, in A∗ conditionals are identified with a
particular subset of its elements, namely those elements that can be expressed via (10)
above. This difference owes mainly to the fact that the two approaches really capture
distinct intuitions about conditional probability.
9 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have introduced a construction which defines, for every Boolean algebra of
events A, its corresponding Boolean algebra of conditional events C(A). Our construction
preserves the finiteness of A, in the sense that C(A) is finite whenever so is A. Actually, in
the case of finite algebras, we have provided a full characterization of the atomic structure
of C(A) and proved that any positive probability measure P on A canonically extends to
a (plain) positive probability µP on C(A) that coincides with the conditional probability
induced by P , that is, it satisfies the condition:
µP (a | b) =
P (a ∧ b)
P (b)
,
for any events a, b ∈ A. Finally we have introduced the logic LBC to reason about
conditionals which is sound and complete with respect to a semantics defined in accordance
with the notion of Boolean algebra of conditionals. Moreover, we have pointed out the
tight connections of this logic with preferential nonmonotonic consequence relations.
Several interesting questions remain open and we aim to address them in future work.
In this work we have not considered algebras with iterated conditionals. It would be
interesting to study whether it is possible to introduce in the algebras of conditionals
C(A) a proper binary operator capturing the notion of iterated conditioning, for instance
in the sense of whether an object of the form ((a | b) | (c | d)) can be defined as another
element of C(A) in a meaningful way, i.e. without having to resort to a meta-structure of
the kind C(C(A)).
As we have shown, given a positive probability P on an algebra of events A, we can
extend it to a probability µP on the whole algebra of conditionals C(A), and hence it is
in principle possible to compute the probability of any compound conditional. However it
would be interesting to investigate whether there are more operational rules for computing
the probability of conjunctions and disjunctions of basic conditionals. In particular, one
could check whether rules appearing in e.g. [26, 33] apply also in our framework.
40
On the measure-theoretical side we leave open the problem of generalizing Theorem
6.13 to the case when P is a not necessarily positive probability on A. Preliminary
investigations in this direction shows that a result of this kind needs a deeper algebraic
analysis of the Boolean algebras of conditionals C(A), in particular on the relation between
the congruences of A and those of C(A).
At the foundational level, a pressing question will be to investigate Boolean algebras
of conditionals in light of de Finetti’s coherence criterion for conditional assignments. In
particular we will investigate if, or up to which extent, the coherence of a “book” on
conditional events (a1 | b1), . . . , (ak | bk) can be characterized in terms of the coherence
of an “unconditional book” on the (ai | bi)’s viewed as elements of a Boolean algebra of
conditionals. A satisfactory solution to this problem would then motivate the extension
of this coherence-based analysis to non-probabilisitic measures of uncertainty, along the
lines of [19].
More generally, a natural question to be addressed in future research has to do with
defining non-probabilistic analogues of the relation established in the present paper be-
tween Boolean algebras of conditionals and conditional probabilities. Most interesting
targets include possibility and necessity measures, ranking functions, belief and plausibil-
ity functions, and imprecise probabilities.
As to those latter recall that, as a consequence of Corollary 6.6, convexity fails, in
general, for sets of separable probabilities. This raises the question as to how separable
probabilities relate to the long standing problem (see e.g. [11]) of reconciling various forms
of qualified stochastic independence with convex sets of probabilities.
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A Proofs
Proofs from Section 3
Proposition 3.8. In every algebra C(A) the following properties hold for every a, c ∈ A
and b ∈ A′:
(i) (a | b) ≥ (b | b) iff a ≥ b;
(ii) if a ≤ c, then (a | b) ≤ (c | b); in particular a ≤ c iff (a | ⊤) ≤ (c | ⊤);
(iii) if a ≤ b ≤ d, then (a | b) ≥ (a | d); in particular (a | b) ≥ (a | a ∨ b);
(iv) if (a | b) 6= (c | b), then a ∧ b 6= c ∧ b;
(v) (a ∧ b | ⊤) ≤ (a | b) ≤ (b→ a | ⊤);
(vi) if a ∧ d = ⊥ and ⊥ < a ≤ b, then (a | ⊤) ⊓ (d | b) = ⊥C;
(vii) (b | ⊤) ⊓ (a | b) ≤ (a | ⊤).
Proof. (i). By definition, (a | b) ≥ (b | b) iff (a | b) ⊓ (b | b) = (b | b) iff, by Proposition
3.3 (iv), (b | b) = (a ∧ b | b) = (a | b). Finally, let us prove that if a 6≥ b, then
(a | b) < ⊤C. If a 6≥ b, then a ∧ b < b and hence there exists c ∈ A, different from
⊥, such that b = (a ∧ b) ∨ c. Therefore, from Proposition 3.3 (i) and Proposition 3.6
(iii), ⊤C = (b | b) = ((a ∧ b) ∨ c | b) = (a ∧ b | b) ∨ (c | b) and (c | b) 6= ⊥C. Thus,
(a | b) = (a ∧ b | b) < ⊤C.
(ii). If a ≤ c, then a ∧ c = a, and hence (a ∧ c | b) = (a | b). Therefore by Proposition 3.3
(ii), (a | c) ⊓ (c | b) = (a | b), and (a | b) ≤ (c | b). Moreover, if (a | ⊤) ≤ (c | ⊤), then
easily (a→ c | ⊤) = ⊤C = (⊤ | ⊤). From Proposition 3.6 (i), a→ c = ⊤, and hence a ≤ c
and the first part of (ii) holds.
(iii). If a ≤ b ≤ d, then Proposition 3.3 (v) implies that (a | d) = (a | b) ⊓ (b | d), and
hence (a | d) ≤ (a | b).
(iv). It directly follows from Proposition 3.3 (iv).
(v). First of all, (a | b) = (a ∧ b | b) ≥ (a ∧ b | ⊤) from Proposition 3.3 (iv) and the last
claim of (ii). In order to show the second inequality, assume first a ≤ b. Since b∨¬b = ⊤
we have (a | b) = (a | b) ⊓ (b ∨ ¬b | b) = ((a | b) ⊓ (b | ⊤)) ⊔ ((a | b) ⊓ (¬b | ⊤)). Now, from
Proposition 3.3 (v), (a | b) ⊓ (b | ⊤) = (a | ⊤), and clearly (a | b) ⊓ (¬b | ⊤) ≤ (¬b | ⊤),
therefore (a | b) ≤ (a | ⊤) ⊔ (¬b | ⊤) = (¬b ∨ a | ⊤). Now, in the general case, (a | b) =
(a ∧ b | b) ≤ (¬b ∨ (a ∧ b) | ⊤) = (¬b ∨ a | ⊤) = (b→ a | ⊤).
(vi). We have (a | ⊤) ≤ (a | b) from (ii). Then, (a | ⊤)⊓ (d | b) ≤ (a | b)⊓ (d | b) = (a∧ d |
b) = (⊥ | b) = ⊥C.
(vii). From Proposition 3.3 (iv) and (ii), it follows that (b | ⊤)⊓ (a | b) = (b | ⊤)⊓ (a ∧ b |
b) ≤ (b | ⊤) ⊓ (a ∧ b | ⊤) = (a ∧ b | ⊤) ≤ (a | ⊤).
Proposition 3.9. In every algebra C(A) the following properties hold for all a, a′ ∈ A
and b, b′ ∈ A′:
(i) (a | b) ⊓ (a | b′) ≤ (a | b ∨ b′); in particular, (a | b) ⊓ (a | ¬b) ≤ (a | ⊤);
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(ii) if a ≤ b ∧ b′, then (a | b) ⊓ (a | b′) = (a | b ∨ b′);
(iii) (a | b) ≤ (b→ a | b ∨ b′);
(iv) (a | b) ⊓ (a′ | b′) ≤ ((b→ a) ∧ (b′ → a′) | b ∨ b′).
Proof. (i). For all a ∈ A and b and c in A′, since (b∨ c | b∨ c) = ⊤C, (a | b)⊓ (a | c) = (a |
b) ⊓ (a | c) ⊓ (b ∨ c | b ∨ c) = (a | b) ⊓ (a | c) ⊓ ((b | b ∨ c) ⊔ (c | b ∨ c))) =
= ((a | b) ⊓ (a | c) ⊓ (b | b ∨ c)) ⊔ ((a | b) ⊓ (a | c) ⊓ (c | b ∨ c)). (12)
Now, (a | b)⊓ (a | c)⊓ (b | b∨ c) ≤ (a | b)⊓ (b | b∨ c) = (a∧ b | b)⊓ (b | b∨ c) = (a∧ b | b∨ c),
where the first equality is due to Proposition 3.3 (iv) and the second one to Proposition
3.3 (v). Analogously, we have (a | b)⊓(a | c)⊓(c | b∨c) ≤ (a | c)⊓(c | b∨c) = (a∧c | b∨c).
Thus, by (12), we get that (a | b) ⊓ (a | c) ≤ (a ∧ b | b ∨ c) ⊔ (a ∧ c | b ∨ c) = (a ∧ (b ∨ c) |
b ∨ c) = (a | b ∨ c), from Proposition 3.3 (iv).
Obviously the particular case follows by taking b′ = ¬b.
(ii). Now, assume a ≤ b ∧ b′. Then, from (12) the claim follows provided that, under this
further hypothesis, (a | b) ⊓ (a | b′) ⊓ (b | b ∨ b′) = (a | b) ⊓ (b | b ∨ b′) and (a | b) ⊓ (a |
b′) ⊓ (b′ | b ∨ b′) = (a | b′) ⊓ (b′ | b ∨ b′). Let us prove the first equality, the second being
completely analogous.
First of all (a | b) = (a∧b | b) (recall Proposition 3.3 (iv)), whence (a | b)⊓ (a | b′)⊓ (b |
b∨ b′)) = (a∧ b | b)⊓ (a | b′)⊓ (b | b∨ b′) = (a∧ b | b∨ b′)⊓ (a | b′) (the last equality follows
from Proposition 3.3 (v)). Now, (a∧b | b∨b′) ≤ (a | b∨b′) ≤ (a | b′) because by hypothesis
a ≤ b′ ≤ b∨b′. Thus, (a∧b | b∨b′)⊓(a | b′) = (a∧b | b∨b′) = (a | b∨b′) since a ≤ b. Finally,
since again a ≤ b ≤ b∨ b′, from Proposition 3.3 (v), one has (a | b∨ b′) = (a | b)∧ (b | b∨ b′)
as desired.
(iii). In every Boolean algebra it holds that b→ a = ¬b∨a ≥ ¬b. Thus b→ a ≥ ¬b ≥ c∧¬b.
Thus, from Proposition 3.8 (i), (b → a | c ∧ ¬b) = ⊤C. Hence, (a | b) ≤ (b → a | b) and
(a | b) ≤ (b→ a | c ∧ ¬b), whence (a | b) ≤ (b→ a | b) ⊓ (b→ a | c ∧ ¬b). The latter, from
(i), is less or equal to (b→ a | (c ∧ ¬b) ∨ b) = (b→ a | c ∨ b). This settles the claim.
(iv). From (iii), (a | b) ≤ (b → a | b ∨ b′) and (a′ | b′) ≤ (b′ → a′ | b ∨ b′). Thus,
(a | b) ⊓ (a′ | b′) ≤ (b→ a | b ∨ b′) ⊓ (b′ → a′ | b ∨ b′) = ((b→ a) ∧ (b′ → a′) | b ∨ b′).
Proofs from Section 4
Proposition 4.3. Parti(C(A)) is a partition of C(A).
Proof. We have to prove the two following conditions:
(a)
⊔
Parti(C(A)) = ⊤C,
(b) for distinct t1, t2 ∈ Parti(C(A)), t1 ⊓ t2 = ⊥C.
(a) We shall prove this claim by induction on i. The case i = 1 is easy as Seq1(A) =
{〈α〉 | α ∈ at(A)} and clearly
⊔
α∈at(A)(α | ⊤) = (
∨
α α | ⊤) = ⊤C.
If 1 < i, let 1 < j ≤ i and suppose the claim is true for j−1, that is,
⊔
Partj−1(C(A)) =
⊤C. We have to prove that
⊔
Partj(C(A)) = ⊤C as well. For each sequence β =
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〈β1, . . . , βj−1〉 ∈ Seqj−1(A), consider its corresponding compound conditional ωβ = (β1 |
⊤) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (βj−1 | ¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬βj−2). By inductive hypothesis, we have
⊔
β∈Seqj−1(A)
ωβ =
⊔
Partj−1(C(A)) = ⊤C.
Further, let D(β) = at(A) \ {β1, . . . βj−1} be the set of n− j + 1 atoms of A disjoint
from {β1, . . . βj−1}. Then it is clear that
⊔
α∈D(β)
(α | ¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬βj−1) = ⊤C,
and thus ωβ =
⊔
α∈D(β) ωβ ⊓ (α | ¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬βj−1).
Therefore, since this holds for every sequence β ∈ Seqj−1, we finally get:
⊤C =
⊔
β∈Seqj−1(A)
ωβ =
⊔
β∈Seqj−1(A)

 ⊔
β∈D(β)
ωβ ⊓ (β | ¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬βj−1)


=
⊔
δ∈Seqj(A)
ωδ =
⊔
Partj(C(A)).
(b) Let ωα, ωβ ∈ Parti(C(A)) with α 6= β. To be more precise, if α = 〈α1, . . . , αi〉 and
β = 〈β1, . . . , βi〉, let 1 ≤ k ≤ i the minimum index such that αk 6= βk. Then it holds that
(αk | ¬α1∧. . .¬αk−1)⊓(βk | ¬β1∧. . .¬βk−1) = ⊥C since ¬α1∧. . .¬αk−1 = ¬β1∧. . .¬βk−1
and αk ∧ βk = ⊥. Then, the claim follows from observing that α ⊓ β ≤ (αk | ¬α1 ∧
. . .¬αk−1) ⊓ (βk | ¬β1 ∧ . . .¬βk−1).
Corollary 4.8. Let A be a Boolean algebra with |at(A)| = n. For every basic conditional
(a | b) ∈ C(A) with a ≤ b, |at≤(a | b)| = n! ·
|at≤(a)|
|at≤(b)|
.
Proof. We start proving the following
Claim 1. If a = α is an atom of A, then |at≤(α | b)| =
n!
|at≤(b)|
.
Proof. (of Claim 1) Obviously, if b is an atom, and since we are assuming a ≤ b, it must
be a = b = α. Then |at≤(a | b)| = |at≤(α | α)| = |at(⊤C)| = n!. Conversely, if b is not an
atom, let α1, . . . , αk ∈ at(A) (with k > 1) such that b =
∨k
i=1 αi. Further, since α ≤ b,
there is i0 ≤ k such that αi0 = α. For simplicity, and without any loss of generality,
assume i0 = 1. Hence,
n! = |at≤(α1 ∨ α2 ∨ . . . ∨ αk | b)| =
k∑
i=1
|at≤(αi | b)|
and hence, by a symmetric argument, |at≤(α | b)| =
n!
k
= n!|at≤(b)| and Claim 1 is settled.
Coming back to the proof of Corollary 4.8, and remembering from Proposition 4.1 that
a | b =
∨
α≤x(α | y), we have that, thanks to Claim 1, |at≤(a | b)| = |at≤(a)| ·
n!
|at≤(b)|
.
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Proofs from Section 6
For the proof of next lemma recall the tree structure T introduced in Section 5.1.
Lemma 6.8. The map µP is a probability distribution on at(C(A)), that is,
∑
α∈Seq(A)
µP (ωα) = 1.
Proof. Let |at(A)| = n and let T be as described in Section 4. Attach to each node of T
the following values:
• Level 0: recall that the root node is (⊤ | ⊤). Thus attach P (⊤ | ⊤) = 1.
• Level 1: attach to each node (αi | ⊤) of level 1 the value P (αi). By definition of
atom and since P is a probability measure, we have that
∑
α∈at(A)
P (α) = 1.
• Level i: For each node βi−1 at level i − 1, let 〈β1, . . . , βi−1〉 the partial sequence
corresponding to the path from (⊤ | ⊤) to βi−1. Then attach to the n − i children
nodes the value P (β | ¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬βi−1). Note again that
∑
β∈at(A)\{β1,...,βi−1}
P (β | ¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬βi−1) = 1.
Recall also that, by construction of T, at(C(A)) is in 1-1 correspondence with the paths
from the root to the leaf nodes of the tree. Furthermore, the above procedure attaches
to each node x of T, the value P (x) =
∑
ωα≤x
µP (ωα). Thus, in particular, for every leaf
l, P (l) = µP (ωαl) where αl is the sequence in Seq(A) which uniquely corresponds to the
path from ⊤ | ⊤ to l. Thus, by the above construction, letting LT the set of leafs of T,
one has
1 =
∑
l∈LT
P (l) =
∑
l∈LT
µP (ωαl) =
∑
α∈Seq(A)
µP (ωα).
Thus, the claim is settled.
Lemma 6.10. Let αi1 , . . . , αit ∈ at(A). Then
(i) µP (Jαi1 , . . . , αitK) = P (αi1) · P (αi2 )P (¬αi1 ) · . . . ·
P (αit )
P (¬αi1∧¬αi2∧...∧¬αit−1 )
.
(ii) µP (Jαi1 , . . . , αitK) = µP (Jαi1 , . . . , αij−1 , αij+1 , . . . , αitK) · P (αij )P (¬αi1∧¬αi2∧...∧¬αit−1 ) .
Proof. (i). Let γ1, . . . , γl be the atoms of A different from αi1 , . . . , αit . Thus, ωδ ∈Jαi1 , . . . , αitK iff δ = 〈αi1 , . . . , αit , σ〉 for σ any string which is obtained by permuting l− 1
elements in {γ1, . . . , γl}.
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Therefore, letting Ψ = ¬αi1∧. . .∧¬αit , K = P (αi1)·
P (αi2 )
P (¬αi1 )
·. . . ·
P (αit )
P (¬αi1∧¬αi2∧...∧¬αit−1 )
and H =
∑
σ
P (σ1)
P (Ψ) ·
P (σ2)
P (Ψ∧¬σ1)
· . . . ·
P (σl−1)
P (Ψ∧¬σ1∧...∧¬σn−2)
, one has
µP (Jαi1 , . . . , αitK) = K ·H.
We now prove by induction on l that H = 1.
(Case 0) The basic case is for l = 2. In this case H = P (γ1)
P (Ψ) +
P (γ2)
P (Ψ) =
P (γ1∨γ2)
P (Ψ) . Thus, the
claim trivially follows because Ψ = γ1 ∨ γ2.
(Case l) For any j = 1, . . . , l we focus on the strings σ whose first coordinate σ1 = γj .
Therefore,
H = P (γ1)
P (Ψ) ·
∑
σ:σ1=γ1
( P (σ2)
P (Ψ∧¬γ1)
· . . . ·
P (σl−1)
P (Ψ∧¬σ1∧...∧¬σn−2)
) + . . .
. . .+ P (γl)
P (Ψ) ·
∑
σ:σ1=γl
( P (σ2)
P (Ψ∧¬γ1)
· . . . ·
P (σl−1)
P (Ψ∧¬σ1∧...∧¬σn−2)
).
By inductive hypothesis, each term
∑
σ:σ1=γj
( P (σ2)
P (Ψ∧¬γ1)
· . . . · P (σl−1)
P (Ψ∧¬σ1∧...∧¬σn−2)
) equals 1.
Thus, H =
∑l
j=1
P (γj)
P (Ψ) = 1 since Ψ =
∨l
j=1 γj.
(ii). The claim follows from (i) and direct computation.
Lemma 6.11. Let α1 | b be a basic conditional and let ¬b = β1 ∨ . . . ,∨βk with βk = αn.
Then the following hold. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},
µP (BJαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) = µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt−1, α1K) · P (βt)
P (b)
.
Proof. We prove the claim by reverse induction on t. The basic case is hence for t =
k − 1. In that case, by construction of the set Jαn, βπ(1), . . . , βπ(t), α1K, one has thatJαn, β1, . . . , βk−1, α1K is a leaf of B (recall Definition 5.4). Thus,
BJαn, β1, . . . , βk−1, α1K = Jαn, β1, . . . , βk−1α1K.
Therefore, µP (BJαn, β1, . . . , βk−1, α1K) = µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βk−1, α1K) and by Lemma 6.10
(ii), the latter equals
µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βk−2, α1K) · P (βk−1)
P (¬αn ∧ ¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬βk−1)
.
Therefore, the claim follows by noticing that b = ¬αn ∧ ¬β1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬βk−1 as we put
αn = βk.
Now, let t < k − 1. Thus, by construction of B, µP (T Jαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) =
µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) +
∑
βl 6∈{β1,...,βt}
µP (BJαn, β1, . . . , βt, βl, α1K)
and the inductive hypothesis ensures that
µP (BJαn, β1, . . . , βt, βl, α1K) = µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) · P (βl)
P (b)
.
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Thus,
µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) +
∑
βl 6∈{β1,...,βt}
µP (BJαn, β1, . . . , βt, βl, α1K) =
= µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) ·
(
1 +
P (d)
P (b)
)
,
where d =
∨
βl 6∈{β1,...,βt}
βl. Again, Lemma 6.10 (2) gives,
µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) = µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt−1, α1K) · P (βt)
P (¬αn ∧ ¬β1 . . . ∧ ¬βt)
.
Notice that 1 + P (d)
P (b) =
P (b∨d)
P (b) and b ∨ d = ¬αn ∧ ¬β1 . . . ∧ ¬βt. Thus,
P (b ∨ d) = P (¬αn ∧ ¬β1 . . . ∧ ¬βt). (13)
Therefore,
µP (BJαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) = µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) +
∑
βl 6∈{β1,...,βt}
µP (BJαn, β1, . . . , βt, βl, α1K).
= µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt, α1K) ·
(
1 + P (d)
P (b)
)
= µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt−1, α1K) · P (βt)P (¬αn∧¬β1...∧¬βt) ·
(
P (b∨d)
P (b)
)
= µP (Jαn, β1, . . . , βt−1, α1K) · P (βt)P (b)
where the last equality follows from (13).
Lemma 6.12. Let α1 | b be a basic conditional and let b ≥ α1. Then,
(i) µP (S1) = P (α1).
(ii) For all 2 ≤ j ≤ n, µP (Sj) =
P (α1) · P (αj)
P (b)
.
Proof. (i) immediately follows from Lemma 6.11 (i) noticing that, indeed, S1 = Jα1K by
Lemma 5.1 (i). Let hence prove (ii). In particular, and without loss of generality, let us
prove the claim for αj = αn. As in the statement, let us call β1, . . . , βk those atoms of A
such that ¬b =
∨k
i=1 βi. In particular, without loss of generality due to Lemma 5.1 (ii),
let us put βk = αn.
Notice that µP (Sn) = µP (BJαn, α1K) which, by construction and thanks to Lemma
6.11, equals
µP (Jαn, α1K) +
k−1∑
j=1
µP (BJαn, βj , α1K) = P (αn) · P (α1)
P (¬αn)
+
k−1∑
j=1
µP (Jαn, α1K) · P (βj)
P (b)
,
Therefore, since by Lemma 6.10 (i), µP (Jαn, α1K) = P (αn) · P (α1)P (¬αn) , we get
µP (Sn) = P (αn) ·
P (α1)
P (¬αn)

1 +
k−1∑
j=1
P (βj)
P (b)

 = P (αn) · P (α1)
P (¬αn)

P
(
b ∨
∨k−1
j=1 βj
)
P (b)

 .
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Finally, notice that b ∨
∨k−1
j=1 βj = ¬αn. Thus, P
(
b ∨
∨k−1
j=1 βj
)
= P (¬αn) and
µP (Sn) = P (αn) · P (α1) ·
(
1
P (b)
)
which settles the claim.
Proofs from Section 7
Theorem 7.3. CL/≡ ∼= C(L).
The proof needs some previous elaboration. For each satisfiable proposition ϕ ∈ L, let ϕ∗
be its expression in full DNF. We assume that there is a unique such full DNF expression
for each formula, i.e. ϕ∗ is the unique representative of the class [ϕ] of CPL formulas
equivalent to ϕ in full DNF. Thus, let
• L∗ be the set of satisfiable propositional formulas from L in full DNF,
• V ∗ = {(ϕ∗ | ψ∗) : ϕ∗ ∈ L∗ ∪ {⊥}, ψ∗ ∈ L∗},9
• Free(V ∗) be the freely generated Boolean algebra with generators V ∗
Let us define an equivalence relation on Free(V ∗) as follows: Φ∗ ≡ Ψ∗ iff LBC ⊢ Φ∗ ↔
Ψ∗. (the latter due to rules (R1) and (R2) and CPL reasoning).
Actually, ≡ is indeed a congruence relation on Free(V ∗), that satisfies the five prop-
erties:
- (ϕ∗ | ϕ∗) ≡ ⊤
- (ϕ∗ | ψ∗) ∧ (γ∗ | ψ∗) ≡ ((ϕ ∧ γ)∗ | ψ∗)
- ¬(ϕ∗ | ψ∗) ≡ ((¬ϕ)∗ | ψ∗)
- (ϕ∗ | ψ∗) ≡ ((ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ | ψ∗)
- (ϕ∗ | ψ∗) ∧ (ψ∗ | γ∗) ≡ (ϕ∗ | γ∗), when ⊢CPL ϕ→ ψ → γ
Therefore, ≡ and ≡C as defined in Section 3 are the same congruence on Free(V
∗)
and, consequently,
Free(V ∗)/≡ ∼= Free(V
∗)/≡C .
Now, let L∗ be the Lindenbaum algebra of the language L∗. Notice that, as boolean
algebra, L∗ contains a bottom element, although the symbol ⊥ does not belong to the
language L∗ as we previously remarked. Thus, V ∗ = L∗ × (L∗)′, whence they generate
isomorphic free algebras, that is to say, Free(V ∗) ∼= Free(L∗ × (L∗)′). Therefore, passing
at the quotients, one has Free(V ∗)/≡C
∼= Free(L∗×(L∗)′)/≡C and the latter, by definition,
equals C(L∗). Thus, we conclude that
Free(V ∗)/≡C
∼= C(L∗)
Finally notice that, since L∗ is actually isomorphic to the Lindenbaum algebra L of L, one
finally has the following
Lemma A.1. C(L) ∼= Free(V ∗)/≡.
9It is well-known that contradictory formulas like ⊥ = ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ cannot be expressed in full DNF. For
this reason we need to add that symbol to L∗ to be a possible consequent of a basic conditional.
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Now consider the sublanguage CL∗ of CL built from basic conditionals (ϕ∗ | ψ∗). If Φ
is an LBC-formula, we will denote by Φ∗ the formula from CL∗ obtained by replacing all
propositional formulas ϕ in basic conditionals in Φ by their DNF expressions.
The relation ≡ which is a congruence of Free(V ∗) clearly also is an equivalence relation
on CL∗ and hence, since ≡ is compatible with Boolean operations, the structure CL∗ =
(CL∗/≡,∧,∨,¬,⊥,⊤) is a Boolean algebra.
Lemma A.2. CL∗ ∼= Free(V ∗)/≡.
Proof. Since CL∗ and Free(V ∗)/≡ are finite algebras we only need to exhibit a bijec-
tion between their supports. Notice that the elements of CL∗ and those of Free(V ∗)/≡
are indeed the same elements, i.e., equivalence classes of Boolean combinations of ba-
sic conditionals whose antecedent and consequent are in DNF. Further the equivalence
classes are determined by the same equivalence relation. Thus, clearly, the sets CL∗/≡ and
Free(V ∗)/≡ are actually the same set and hence the claim follows.
Now we can finally prove the desired isomorphism claimed in Theorem 7.3: CL/≡ ∼=
C(L)
Proof. Due to Lemmas A.1 and A.2 it is enough to prove that CL ∼= CL∗, that is, for
each formula Φ of CL, Φ is a theorem of LBC iff Φ∗ can be proved from the DNF-instances
(A1)∗ − (A5)∗ of the axioms of LBC, axioms and rules of CPL, but without the use of
(R1) and (R2).
Every formula Φ∗ is logically equivalent, in CPL, to Φ and also every (Ai) is clearly
logically equivalent to its DNF. Thus if Φ∗ can be proved from (A1)∗−(A5)∗ without (R1)
and (R2), then Φ∗ is a theorem of LBC and hence so is Φ.
Conversely, assume that π = Ψ1, . . . ,Ψk (where Ψk = Φ) is a proof of Φ in LBC. First
of all, we can safely replace each Ψi by its DNF Ψ
∗
i without loss of generality so defining a
list of formulas π∗ all in DNF. Further notice that, in replacing Ψi by Ψ
∗, any occurrence
of the rule (R1) becomes
(R1)∗ from ⊢CPL ϕ
∗ → ψ∗, derive (ϕ∗ | χ∗)→ (ψ∗ | χ∗).
Then, since in DNF we have ⊢CPL ϕ
∗ ↔ ψ∗ iff ϕ∗ = ψ∗, (R1)∗ yields the following
derived rule: if ϕ∗ = ψ∗, derive (ϕ∗ | χ∗) ↔ (ψ∗ | χ∗), i.e., essentially, for all ϕ, derive
(ϕ∗ | χ∗)↔ (ϕ∗ | χ∗), which is trivial and hence can be omitted in π∗. The same obviously
applies to (R2).
Thus, summing up, π∗ is a proof of Φ∗ made of formulas in CL∗ and which does not
use any occurrence of (R1) and (R2). Thus, the claim is settled.
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